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Identity and Assimilation: Changing
Definitions of Tribal Power Over Children
Barbara Ann Atwoodt
The Elders spoke, "You, yes, you young, listen today for one day
we will be gone! You will take care of the foods, for they are out
therel The fish in the water, they return today for each of us."...
The Elders spoke in words, and used body language and different
types of objects-wood, rocks, and animals. Each of the words were
heard by the children, for the words were in a voice and tone that
cared. For the unwritten law is caring for the food and the children,
and the children yet unborn.
Those days of long ago are still here.... [T]he Elders still tell sto-
ries of the unwritten laws. Children need unwritten laws that will
speak the messages the Elders would have spoken long ago. The El-
ders used traditional courts that operated long before the Europeans
came.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws promulgated a revised child custody juris-
dictional law, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and En-
forcement Act (UCCJEA).2 In this new Act, the Commissioners
for the first time have included an optional section extending
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1. Julian D. Pinkham, Speaking to Tribal Judges on Improving Chil-
dren's Court Practice in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases in our Country: A Pro-
posal for a Uniform Children's Code, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 159, 161-62
(1997).
2. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT §§101405,
9 U.L.A. 242 (Supp. 1998).
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the recognition and enforcement principles of the Act to Indian
tribes.3 The optional section treats Indian tribes as states and
ensures recognition of tribal child custody decrees so long as
the tribal decrees are in substantial conformity with the juris-
dictional premises of the Act.4 This provision of the revised
law, while provoking little commentary,5 raises an important
policy choice for state legislatures and for tribal councils as
well. A state's decision whether to extend the uniform law to
Indian tribes and a tribe's decision whether to incorporate the
uniform law into its tribal code implicate fundamental ques-
tions about tribal identity and the legitimacy of tribes as sover-
eigns. Interestingly, of the two states that have adopted the
UCCJEA to date, one has opted to extend the Act to Indian
tribes pursuant to the whole of section 104, and the other has
not.6 Legislation to enact the new law is now pending in at
least eleven additional states and one U.S. territory.7
This Article explores the concept of tribal sovereignty
through the lens of tribal jurisdiction in child custody disputes.
Tribal jurisdiction over children no longer exists in isolation.
With increases in migration across reservation boundaries and
intermarriage between Indians and non-Indians, 8 tribal-state
3. See id. § 104, discussed infra at notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
4. Section 104 of the UCCJEA provides in relevant part:
(b) A court of this State shall treat a tribe as if it were a State of
the United States for the purpose of applying [the jurisdiction and
recognition provisions of the Act].
(c) A child-custody determination made by a tribe under factual
circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional stan-
dards of this [Act] must be recognized and enforced under [the Act].
5. Media coverage of the release of the UCCJEA has disregarded the
question of extending the Act to Indian tribes. See, e.g., Mike McCurley et al.,
Jurisdiction Act Seeks Consistency, NAT'L L.J., May 11, 1998, at B7.
6. Compare S.B. 1237, 46th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 1998) (codified at 43
OKLA. STAT. § 551-104 (Supp. 1998)) (adopting UCCJEA, including optional
section that extends Act to tribes) with H.B. 335, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska
1998) (adopting UCCJEA but not extending Act to Indian tribes).
7. See Oklahoma, Alaska Take Lead in Adopting Uniform Child Custody
Act Amendments, 67 U.S.L.W. 2008 (July 7, 1998) (noting that the UCCJEA
has been introduced in the legislatures of California, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Virginia, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
8. According to a study based on 1990 Census data, American Indians
intermarry with whites at a rate that is higher than that recorded for Asians,
African-Americans, or Hispanics. See V. Dion Haynes & Vincent J. Schodol-
ski, Interracial Marriages Increase: But Black-White Unions Still Face Most
Resistance, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 1998, at 1 (reporting that 52.9 percent of
American Indian men and 53.9 percent of American Indian women between
[Vol. 83:927928
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conflicts in child custody disputes are increasing as well. As a
result, an Indian tribe today may face a dilemma created by
two potentially competing goals: first, the tribe's desire for rec-
ognition as a co-equal sovereign within this nation's federal
system-an objective that often depends on the tribe's willing-
ness to conform to majoritarian standards, and, second, the
tribe's desire to protect and develop its unique cultural iden-
tity.
The goal of achieving respect as a sovereign necessarily
encompasses the aspiration that tribal acts, including judicial
decrees, be accorded recognition throughout the United States.
The recognition of tribal decrees beyond the borders of the res-
ervation is a telling measure of sovereignty since the extent to
which Anglo-American governmental entities enforce official
tribal acts reveals the tribe's status in the eyes of the outsiders.
Anglo-American courts have often viewed tribal justice as dif-
ferent, marked, or "the other," and therefore inferior to the
unmarked justice system of the dominant society.9 A tribal de-
cree relating to the custody of a child, where the contestants
include a non-Indian, may implicate with particular intensity
the diverse world views of state and tribe. In such circum-
stances, the tribal judge and the state court judge may each
claim a superior legal and cultural authority to determine the
best interests of the child. Predictably, a tribe's willingness to
mold its laws to conform to Anglo-American standards en-
hances the likelihood that tribal acts will be respected beyond
the boundaries of the reservation.
the ages of 25 and 34 were married to whites, compared to significantly lower
percentages for other minority groups).
9. For a discussion of the impact of "marking" to reinforce the dominant,
privileged, and unmarked norm, see john a. powell, The Multiple Self- Explor-
ing Between and Beyond Modernity and Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REV.
1481, 1511-13 (1997); Mary Coombs, Interrogating Identity, 11 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 222, 229 (1996); Mary Louise Fellows & Sherene Razack, The
Race to Innocence: Confronting Hierarchical Relations Among Women, 1 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 335, 341 (1998). As observed by Professor Pommer-
sheim:
In the context of colonialism or other oppressive forces, the majori-
tarian society often defines differences as negative. For example, the
history of Indian-non-Indian relations is replete with labels such as
primitive, uncivilized, and inferior assigned to Indians.... Such a la-
bel of difference is often the product of the unilateral exercise of
dominant power.
Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on
Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 411, 423.
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Alongside the quest for respect as a sovereign within the
national system is the desire of most tribes to sustain and en-
hance the laws, practices, and traditions that make them cul-
turally unique. Tribes frequently equate their own survival
with the protection of traditional ways of life.10 Although fed-
eral policy towards Indian tribes historically aimed at elimina-
tion of tribal existence, since the advent of the modern era of
"self-determination"" Congress has moved towards the goal of
10. Chief Justice Tso of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court stated that
"[wie, the people, are a natural resource. Our culture and our history are
natural resources. We are so related to the earth and the sky that we cannot
be separated without harm. The protection and defense of both must be pre-
served." Chief Justice Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal
Court, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 234 (1989). The sheer tenacity of the American
Indian tribes' will to survive is worthy of admiration. See FRANK POM.
MERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS 13 (1995) (stating that "whatever the condi-
tions, tribal members have been committed to remaining indelibly Indian,
proudly defining themselves as a people apart and resisting full incorporation
into the dominant society around them"). The popular news frequently re-
ports on efforts by tribes to teach their traditions to tribal children. See, e.g.,
Monica Mendoza, Garden Unites Cultures, Ages, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, June 15,
1998, at B-i, available in 1998 WL 6202828 (describing efforts by Pascua
Yaqui elders to pass on traditional gardening techniques to Yaqui children);
Angelica Pence, Modern Methods Help Students Learn Ancient Tribal Lan-
guage, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, June 1, 1998, at B-i, available in 1998 WL 6202046
(describing course in which Tohono O'odham students learn native language
through computer technology); Enric Volante, Reviving Pride Through Story.
telling, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, May 18, 1998, at A-i, available in 1998 WL 6201347
(describing program in Tohono O'odham school through which tribal elders
tell traditional stories). The Native American Preparatory School in New
Mexico, founded in 1995, provides Indian students from tribes throughout the
United States with a college preparatory education through a special cur-
riculum that "support[s] their native identities, to give a fuller understanding
of the native world in the United States." See Jane Salodof, A New School
Bridges Two Worlds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, at 32A.
11. For a chronology of federal policy towards Indians and Indian tribes,
see generally FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47 (1982)
(dividing federal policy into discrete phases, including the "Formative Years
(1789-1871)," the era of "Allotments and Assimilation (1871-1928)," the period
of "Indian Reorganization (1928-1942)," the era of "Termination (1943-1961),"
and, finally, the era of "Self-Determination (1961 to present)." Vine Deloria,
Jr., has a somewhat different historical perspective. According to his account,
federal Indian law began with a "treaty-making period" when the United
States tried to obtain as much land as possible from tribes, followed by a
"prolonged experiment in social engineering" during which the federal gov-
ernment hoped to extinguish tribes by vesting private property in the hands
of individual tribal members, followed by a period of self-government for
tribes, and culminating today in a period of "negotiated settlements." See
Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the
Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 204-05
(1989); see also ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERIcAN INDIAN LAw 137-64 (3d
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protecting tribal culture from forced assimilation into the
dominant society. This new Congressional direction is reflected
in statutes as disparate as the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975,12 the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978,13 the Native American Graves Protection and Re-
patriation Act of 1990,14 and the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993.15 In addition, many tribes today are searching
for ways of adapting to the demands of an industrialized econ-
omy while maintaining their core cultural attributes. 16
This Article highlights the potential collision of these two
dimensions of tribal sovereignty-legitimacy vis-h-vis other
sovereigns in the national system and the maintenance of a
unique cultural identity-in the context of child custody litiga-
tion. As Part III explains, a few Indian tribes have recognized
the practical benefits of shaping their laws to fit the models of
Anglo-American law and have adopted jurisdictional rules that
parallel those of state law. In light of the provisions of the new
Uniform Act, more tribes may be expected to follow suit. By
conforming their jurisdictional rules to Anglo-American stan-
dards, the tribes will gain legitimacy in the Anglo-American
world and will increase the likelihood that their custody de-
crees will be respected beyond the borders of the tribe, at least
so long as the decrees satisfy the Uniform Act's requirements.
ed. 1991) (summarizing the evolution of federal Indian policy).
12. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-
50n (1994)).
13. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-
63(1994)).
14. Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
3001-13 (1994)).
15. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb-bb-4 (1994)).
16. Paula Mitchell Marks has observed that "[a] new emphasis on
'culturally appropriate' economic programs" is having an effect among Indian
tribes, including, for example, the horse-breeding operation of the Nez Perces
of Idaho, the expanded management of natural resources among southwestern
tribes, and the land-restoration program of the Intertribal Sinkyone Wilder-
ness project. PAULA MITCHELL MARKS, IN A BARREN LAND: AMERICAN INDIAN
DISPOSSESSION AND SURVIVAL 371-74 (1998). Other efforts to combine cul-
tural practices with economic development include the unique tourism attrac-
tions on the Blackfoot Indian Reservation in Montana, see Timothy Egan, In-
dian Reservations Bank on Authenticity to Draw Tourists, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
21, 1998, at Al, and the negotiation of private home loans on Indian reserva-
tions as a result of trust developed between tribes and lenders, see Tribes
Seek Lending Partnerships, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Aug. 6, 1998, at 2B, available
in 1998 WL 6204810.
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That benefit, however, may be at the cost of a measure of tribal
cultural identity. A tribe's unique identity depends in part on
the tribe's ability to adhere to principles of traditional or cus-
tomary law in resolving disputes that come before its courts.
My concern about the impact of assimilation on tribal
identity is not novel. Others have offered compelling accounts
of the human costs of reforming tribal courts to more closely
parallel Anglo-American legal systems.' 7 Here I apply this
shared concern to the often formalistic world of jurisdiction and
enforcement in child custody litigation in order to heighten
awareness of the impact of seemingly neutral principles. In
disputes involving family structure and responsibility for chil-
dren, a tribe's traditional bases for asserting jurisdiction may
reflect values at the core of tribal identity.
But tribal identity is not the only value that hangs in the
balance. Another concern is the quality of adjudication in child
custody contests in both state and tribal courts. Tribal judges
imbue their decisions with a contextual perspective, one that
generally reflects a legal tradition that is diverse from that of
the dominant society.18 As Frank Pommersheim has put it,
tribal court jurisprudence is "an act of culture." 9 Anglo-
17. See Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through
Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous
Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 235, 239 (1997) (arguing that when
Indian tribes deviate from "organic notions of tribal justice" they may lose
their distinct identities, and urging tribes to reestablish a tradition of peace-
making and other dispute resolution methods that were utilized prior to the
dominion of the U.S.); Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains, 7 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 17 (1997) (urging tribal courts to strengthen native con-
cepts ofjustice and traditional methods of dispute resolution). As one scholar
observed with reference to the Navajo Nation's court system, "[t]o the extent
that the courts follow Anglo-American procedures and laws, they may under-
mine Navajo traditions; to the extent that they reject Anglo-American proce-
dures and laws, they may exacerbate the already difficult economic condi-
tions." Michael D. Lieder, Navajo Dispute Resolution and Promissory
Obligations: Continuity and Change in the Largest Native American Nation,
18 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1993) (explaining the dilemma faced by the Na-
vajo Nation in wanting to inspire confidence of outside investors while re-
taining traditional means of resolving disputes); see also Naomi Mezey, The
Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture Through Indian Gaming, 48
STAN. L. REV. 711, 713 (1996) (describing ironic effect of Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act that forces tribes to surrender a measure of sovereignty in or-
der to exercise the federal gaming right).
18. See Robert B. Porter, Introduction to The Tribal Law and Governance
Conference: A Step Towards the Development of Tribal Law Scholarship, 7
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 1, 2-4 (1997).
19. Frank Pommersheim, What Must Be Dons to Achieve The Vision of the
[Vol. 83:927932
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American judges likewise bring their world views to the task of
judging, often effectuating cultural norms through the process
of resolving custody disputes. 20 As compared to the Anglo-
American approach, which typically has viewed struggles over
children as a zero-sum game, a particular tribe may have a
more fluid model of responsibility for children within a family,
a clan, or a village. 21 The method of dispute resolution may be
different in tribal court and state court, with less adversarial
and more mediative proceedings often characterizing tribal
court 2 2 Ideally, if tribes retain their legitimate role in the
resolution of contests over tribal children, custody rulings from
tribal courts will inform and enrich the work of judges within
the state courthouses.23
Twenty-First Century Tribal Judiciary, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 8, 13 (1997)
(urging tribal judges to remain cognizant of how their decisions reflect the cul-
ture in which they are embedded).
20. Numerous critics have maintained that the ubiquitous "best interests"
standard in child custody law allows judges to discriminate on the basis of
gender, race, and sexual orientation in choosing between two fit parents and
to implement their hostility toward unconventional life styles. See MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY (1995)
(describing how mothers have been disadvantaged generally in family law);
MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) (recounting the
racist and sexist nature of historical child custody adjudications); Elizabeth S.
Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615
(1992) (urging greater tolerance for diversity in childrearing arrangements by
creating a preference for past parental roles); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judg-
ments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16 (1987)
(contending that the best interest standard is indeterminate and highly un-
predictable once each parent satisfies minimal fitness).
2L See infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
22. See Zuni, supra note 17, at 28 (contrasting various features of Anglo-
American and indigenous justice). Professor Zuni identifies indigenous justice
as a non-adversarial, fluid process which places paramount emphasis on
community rather than individual rights. See id. In her perception of indige-
nous justice, spiritual matters are not separated from the secular, and resto-
ration of peace-rather than vindication of society-is the ultimate goal. See
id.
23. That the cultural world view of the decisionmaker will inevitably
shape child custody adjudication has been noted by New Zealand scholar
Graeme Austin, discussing the role of the New Zealand Family Court in re-
solving custody disputes over indigenous Maori children:
Decision-making involves a power to sift information, to break down
complex stories into simpler ones, to redefine lived realities of the le-
gal system's consumers, to make choices about custodial alternatives
seem objective and natural. All of this depends on the power of those
who tell laws stories.
9331999]
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If a tribe revises its jurisdictional standards to achieve
greater acceptance among Anglo-American judges, a cluster of
cases may slip from the tribal court's purview. To the extent
that a tribe discards or compromises a traditional jurisdic-
tional approach in order to maintain its role as a co-equal sov-
ereign vis-&-vis state courts, the tribe's complex and nuanced
identity will change.24 Further, if disputes over the custody of
Indian children are resolved by reference to exclusively Anglo-
American jurisdictional and substantive standards, the quality
of the decisionmaking will be impoverished.
I. A PRELIMINARY COMMENT ON TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY
Indian tribes25 are an anomaly in our federal system-they
are neither domestic states nor foreign nations; they have in-
Whether or not New Zealand law accommodates challenges [from the
Maori] based on recognition of the connection between discourse and
power, a legal system that at least faces them honestly is surely
healthier than one that persists in deflecting them against a smooth
surface of supposed political and legal neutrality.
GRAEME AUSTIN, CHILDREN: STORIES THE LAW TELLS 115, 119 (1994).
24. To be sure, the survival of Indian tribes within a dominant society
that was often bent on destroying them has required unending compromise
and adaptation. To some observers, that history can be a rich source of bicul-
tural jurisprudence. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., "The People of the States
Where They Are Found Are Often Their Deadliest Enemies": The Indian Side
of the Story of Indian Rights and Federalism, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 981, 990 (1996).
25. For simplicity, I use the term "Indian tribe" in this paper to refer to
groupings of indigenous peoples in the United States who have received fed-
eral recognition as a tribe. Recognition by the Department of the Interior de-
pends on the satisfaction of several requirements, including historical identifi-
cation as an American Indian or aboriginal group, geographic cohesion,
political authority over members, defined membership criteria, records of cur-
rent and past membership, and existing rules of governance. See 25 C.F.R. §
83.7 (1998). For an insightful discussion of the oppressive and paternalistic
nature of federal tribal recognition, see Jo Carrillo, Identity As Idiom: Mash-
pee Reconsidered, 28 IND. L. REV. 511 (1995). Tribes, of course, are not syn-
onymous with reservations, since more than one tribe may share reservation
lands, and sub-tribal groups such as villages, clans, and families may also fig-
ure prominently in the governance of an Indian community. The tribe, how-
ever, has typically been the formal actor in inter-governmental relations in
modern history and thus seems to be the most appropriate concept for discus-
sions of sovereignty. The enormous differences among Indian tribes are often
overlooked in Indian law scholarship and in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Over 500 tribal governmental entities (including Alaskan Native villages)
have received federal recognition, and another 200 are functioning without
the federal imprimatur. See 62 Fed. Reg. 55270 (1997). The tribes range from
the Navajo Nation, extending into three states and encompassing over 25,000
square miles, to tribes that are a single village with only a few hundred mem-
[Vol. 83:927934
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herent powers of self-government but they are subject to the
absolute authority of the federal government.26 The concept of
tribal sovereignty has created conceptual problems throughout
the history of federal Indian law27 and remains a topic of active
debate today, both outside and inside Indian communities. It
is under attack by non-Indians who fear the perceived increase
in political and economic power of Indian tribes. Although
poverty, crime, and alcoholism are still endemic on reservation
lands,28 the "new buffalo" of the gaming industry has given
some Indian tribes a stronger national presence than ever be-
fore.29 Many outsiders fear that tribes with this increased
strength will claim more than their fair share of land, water,
bers. See, e.g., BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WE THE FIRST
AMERICANS 7 (1993) (summary report on American Indians and Alaskan Na-
tives); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24
N.M. L. REV. 225 (1994). Each tribe's history, its relationship with the federal
government, and its adaptation to the dominant society inform its identity.
Although I speak of "tribes" in this paper, I have tried not to essentialize the
construct of tribe as a monolithic entity. Indeed, the very diversity among
tribes weighs against the adoption of a uniform national policy on judgment
recognition.
26. In 1831, in the first of the two Cherokee cases, Indian tribes were fa-
mously described by Chief Justice Marshall as "domestic dependent na-
tions.... Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). Mar-
shall expanded on the principle of dependent sovereigns the next year in
holding that state laws could have no force within the boundaries of the
Cherokee nation. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
27. A growing body of literature explores the evolution of federal Indian
law from diverse perspectives. See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN
INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW (1987); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of
Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism
in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237
(1989).
28. Unemployment rates among Indians living on reservations have been
reported as high as 49%, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) estimates
that at least half the Indian population lives in poverty. See Tribal Garden
Helps to Ease Pain of Cutbacks in Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1998, at 24A.
The incidence of violent crime on Indian reservations has increased in the
1990s, as has gang activity and substance abuse. See On Indian Reservations
in the West, Violent Crime Soars, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, at 28A.
29. See Mezey, supra note 17, at 713-14; Stephen Goode, The Search for
Sovereignty, 14 INSIGHT MAG. 18, June 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9105505
(describing disparate economic fortunes of five Indian tribes and the tribes'
efforts to preserve their cultures); Scott Canon, Indian Nations: Tribes Reaf-
firm Their Right to Rule, KAN. CITY STAR, June 21, 1998, at Al, available in
1998 WL 2558077 (explaining efforts by various tribes to strengthen self-rule
and the resistance among non-Indians to such tribal ambitions); Amy L. Cox,
Comment, The New Buffalo: Tribal Gaming As a Means of Subsistence Under
Attack, 25 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 863 (1998).
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mineral resources, consumer dollars, and, significantly, chil-
dren.30  Not coincidentally, challenges to different aspects of
tribal sovereignty have emerged recently in Congress.3' The
Supreme Court has entered the fray with opinions that delimit
the legal implications of tribal sovereign status.3 2
The meaning of tribal sovereignty is also the subject of in-
ternal debate among Indian leaders.33 Certain tribes are di-
30. For a recent examination of the popular image of Indian tribes and
their political battles, see Timothy Egan's two-part series, New Prosperity
Brings New Conflict to Indian Country, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1998, at Al, and
Backlash Growing As Indians Make a Stand for Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Backlash].
31. Senator Slade Gorton of Washington, for example, has sponsored pro-
posals to completely abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. See S. 1691, 105th
Cong. (1998) (proposing to abolish tribal sovereign immunity in areas of state
taxation, commercial law, tort, and constitutional litigation); H.R. 2107, 105th
Cong. § 120 (1997) (Sen. Gorton's sponsored amendment to the House appro-
priations bill providing that a tribe's receipt of Bureau of Indian Affairs
funding operates as a waiver of immunity). The Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 (ICWA), codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-23 (1994), has also been the focus
of proposed amendments over the years, most recently in the form of a bill
that, inter alia, would place time limits on a tribe's right to intervene in a
state court proceeding affecting an Indian child. See Indian Child Welfare Act
Amendment of 1996, H.R. 3828, 104th Cong. (1996); see also H.R. 3275, 104th
Cong. (1996) (adopting the "existing Indian family" exception to the ICWA);
Voluntary Adoption Protection Act, H.R. 3156, 104th Cong. (1996) (exempting
voluntary child custody proceedings from the ICWA).
32. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997)
(holding that tribe's suit against state was barred by eleventh amendment);
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that tribal court lacked
jurisdiction over tort suit against nonmember arising out of accident on state
highway running through reservation). In a significant recent decision, Kiowa
Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1700 (1998), the Court upheld
the Kiowa Tribe's assertion of sovereign immunity in a commercial dispute
arising on non-tribal lands. Although the Court handed the tribe a victory, it
clearly invited Congress to abrogate the shield of immunity. In his majority
opinion, Justice Kennedy described the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity
as having "developed almost by accident." Id. at 1703. Moreover, he ob-
served, "[tlhere are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doc-
trine," especially in situations where the immunity harms people who did not
know they were dealing with an Indian tribe or who did not do so voluntarily.
Id. at 1704. The Court chose, however, to defer to Congress, explaining that
Congress was "in a position to weigh and accommodate the competing policy
concerns and reliance interests." Id. at 1705. For a critique of the Justices'
diverse and subjective approaches to tribal sovereignty, see David H. Getches,
Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court
in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996).
33. Crow tribal members currently disagree, for example, about the
authority of the Montana-based tribe to impose taxes on businesses operated




vided over which groups within the tribe possess the legitimate
tribal voice-the right to speak for the tribe.34 As the wealth of
certain tribes has increased, different views about the distribu-
tion of that wealth have produced inevitable factions. Among
the tribes that operate casinos, for example, disagreement has
arisen over how (or whether) the tribal government should in-
clude their members in decisionmaking about gambling in-
come.35 Controversies have arisen over whether the preroga-
tive of the tribal government should supersede the desires of
individual members of the community with respect to a variety
of matters.36 These internal disagreements about the nature of
sovereignty seem to reflect a profound unease among tribal
members concerning contemporary tribal life.
Not surprisingly, debates about tribal sovereignty quickly
become debates about Indian identity.37 To tribal leaders, the
34. See Leesteffy Jenkins & Cara Romanzo, Makah Whaling: Aboriginal
Subsistence or a Stepping Stone to Undermining the Commercial Whaling
Moratorium?, 9 COLO. J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 71, 84 n.42 (1998) (describing
disagreement between tribal elders and younger members regarding cultural
need to resume whaling); Robert Sullivan, Permission Granted to Kill a
Whale. Now What?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 30
(describing disagreement among Makah tribe members about the role of
whaling in tribal history); Karen Alexander, Tlingits Split on Ruling, SEATTLE
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1995, at B1 (describing rift between factions in Tlingit tribal
court regarding nature of banishment as traditional Tlingit punishment);
Jennifer A. Hamilton, Alternative Sentencing in Native America: Justice,
Gender, and Legal Pluralism (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (describing conflict among members of Tlingit tribe over characteriza-
tion of banishment as a traditional punishment).
35. See MARKS, supra note 16, at 365-66; Doug George Kanentiio, Oneidas
Raise Serious Leadership Questions, NEWS FROM INDIAN COUNTRY, Mid-June
1995, at 11 (describing controversy on the Oneida Nation Territory in which
tribe members protested that the tribal government had excluded them from
participating in the gambling agreement with the state).
36. Tribal court opinions sometimes reveal sharp disagreement among
tribal judges about the nature and scope of the tribe's sovereign immunity.
See, e.g., Sulcer v. Barrett, 2 Okla. Trib. 76, 81 (Citizen Band Potawatomi
Tribe Sup. Ct. 1990), available in 1990 WL 655878 (divided court upholding
defense of sovereign immunity in wrongful termination suit against tribal
agency and officers). Disagreements between tribal councils and their mem-
bers also extend to family matters. For example, Indian birth parents' volun-
tary placements of their children with non-Indian families for adoption have
pitted tribes against their members. See, e.g., Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
37. The term "Indian," although an historical misnomer, see ROBERT F.
BERKHOFER, JR., THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 4-5 (1978) (attributing the deriva-
tion of the term "Indian" to the "erroneous geography of Christopher Colum-
bus"), is widely used by Indian and non-Indian scholars alike and is used here
to denote membership in an Indian tribe. See, e.g., MARKS, supra note 16, at
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concept of tribal sovereignty means, among other things, the
right to determine membership.38 As Paula Mitchell Marks
has written:
The problems of sovereignty focus attention on the very concept of
Indianness. Who is an Indian and who is not? ....
These redefinitions [of tribal membership] will be increasingly
necessary as Indians who are trying to build upon their political and
economic gains confront anew the old vexing question of who can
speak for a tribe, or for Indians in general ....
... How do tests for Indianness fit into an American society that
is attempting to move away from discrimination based on race and
ethnicity?39
Marks has identified the tensions inherent in the status of
tribes existing as separate sovereigns within a larger plural-
istic community. As she points out, there are deep-seated dif-
ferences among Indian residents about the proper role of tribes
viii-ix (explaining that "Indian," despite its European origins and inaccuracy,
is the preferred term used by native peoples to define themselves); see also,
e.g., Porter, supra note 17, at 237 n.7 (noting that most native people refer to
themselves as members of their particular nation, tribe, community, pueblo,
or village, but invariably use "Indian" to refer to themselves as part of the
greater population of indigenous people). I have not employed "Native Ameri-
can," a term often used to refer to a racial classification. As a matter of Su-
preme Court Indian jurisprudence, however formalistic, the category of
"Indian" signifies political membership rather than racial identity-a point of
particular importance when Indian-based classifications have been challenged
under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 552 (1974); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-91 (1976). For a
dismantling of the premise of Mancari and a critique of the characterization
of a tribal member as an exclusively political rather than political-racial-
ethnological classification, see Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discon-
tents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV.
1754, 1760-63 (1997).
38. As noted by the President of the National Congress of American Indi-
ans, "ain Indian tribe's right to freely determine its membership criteria goes
to the heart of self-governance and tribal sovereignty." Indian Child Welfare
Joint Hearings of Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs and House Resources
Comm. (June 18, 1997), available in 1997 WL 11234052 (testimony of W. Ron
Allen, President, National Congress of American Indians). Professor Jo Car-
rillo has observed that the categories of Indian and non-Indian often fall into a
set of oppositions, such as primitive/modern, custom/law, oral/written, and
she contends that "the law on tribal identity was one that created and en-
forced a system of biases." Carrillo, supra note 25, at 525; see also Richard
Warren Perry, The Logic of the Modern Nation-State and the Legal Construc-
tion of Native American Tribal Identity, 28 IND. L. REV. 547, 573 (1995)
(arguing that the process of federal tribal recognition requires Indian commu-
nities to fit a definition of identity constructed of European stereotypes).
39. MARKS, supra note 16, at 378-79.
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vis-tt-vis the states and the federal government.40  Moreover,
while most Indian tribes historically have resisted assimilation
and struggled to retain a distinctive cultural and political iden-
tity, their growing power today has highlighted the anomaly of
recognizing unique rights for tribal members in a larger society
formally committed to equality.41
Scholars such as Rebecca Tsosie,42 Robert Williams, 43 and
Vine Deloria, Jr.,44 have illuminated the theoretical confusion
surrounding tribal sovereignty. Tsosie envisions a theory of
indigenous or tribal rights that will not be submerged by
dominant norms of equality, neutrality, and individual rights.
She pointedly challenges the models suggested by liberal
scholars45 and argues that "Indian nations represent a unique
40. See id. at 379 (noting the tension inherent in a tribe's desire to exploit
the unique federal trust relationship while demanding self-determination).
41. See id. at 380. For recent theoretical contributions on the themes of
self-categorization and group identity, see MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR
MYSELF- IDENTITY, POLITICS & THE LAW (1997) (using personal narratives to
show influence of law on identity); see also Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Har-
ris, Afterword Embracing the Tar-Baby-Laterit Theory and the Sticky Mess
of Race, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 499 (1998) (exploring multi-race consciousness from
Latina and African-American perspectives); Leslie G. Espinoza, Multi-
Identity: Community and Culture, 2 VA. J. SOC. POLVY & L. 23 (1994) (using
personal narrative to reveal competing identities of Latina author).
42. Professor Tsosie has argued that true multiculturalism, if it is to tol-
erate tribal views of collective rights, cannot promote an absolutist view of in-
dividual rights associated with Western liberalism. In a thoughtful es-
say/review of Aviam Soifer's book, Law and the Company We Keep, Tsosie
focuses on the unique claims of tribes to group rights and seeks to construct
an alternative theory of group rights outside of the framework of liberal con-
stitutional theory. See Rebecca Tsosie, American Indians and the Politics of
Recognition: Soifer on Law, Pluralism, and Group Identity, 22 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 359 (1997) [hereinafter Tsosie, Pluralism]. She has also explored a
pluralistic vision of tribal sovereign rights as revealed in the decisions of Jus-
tice Marshall. See Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights, and the
Sacred Text: The Legacy of Justice in Thurgood Marshall's Indian Law Juris-
prudence, 26 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 495 (1994) [hereinafter Tsosie, Separate Sover-
eigns].
43. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER:
AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800 (1997);
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).
44. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN
INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE (1983).
45. In particular, Tsosie examines the work of liberal theorists such as
Will Kymnlicka. See generally WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND
CULTURE (1989). See also THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (Will Kymlicka ed.,
1995). Tsosie also focuses on the work of "interculturalist" theorists such as
James Tully. See generally JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CON-
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intersection of international and domestic multiculturalism." 46
In his work, Professor Williams has explored the ways in which
the racist underpinnings of European conquest permeate con-
temporary legal constructs of tribal sovereignty.4 In his view,
the "White Man's Indian Law" has failed to include the In-
dian's role as an active agent in the survival of tribalism. 48
Professor Deloria's scholarship has consistently drawn on his-
tory to inform his interpretation of federal Indian law. He
urges an extra-constitutional construct of tribal sovereignty
based on early understandings of the treaty process. 49
I do not attempt in this Article a theoretical rethinking of
the concept of Indian tribal sovereignty. I focus instead on a
singular dimension of sovereign authority-tribal power over
children-and use that as a vehicle to explore some implica-
tions of contemporary tribal sovereignty. Children, like land,50
are an incommensurable resource for Indian tribes. Many
tribal members see a tribe's exercise of power over children as
a core manifestation of tribal sovereignty-an act that goes to
STITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY (1995).
46. Tsosie, Pluralism, supra note 42, at 386.
47. Using a theme from the case of United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 383-84 (1886), Williams explains how much of federal Indian law revolves
around the perceived role of the federal government as a protector of Indians
against "their deadliest enemies"-white racial power. See Williams, supra
note 24, at 987.
48. Williams argues that scholars and courts are preoccupied with the
Western legal tradition and that much could be gained by heeding the contri-
butions of Indians themselves as to the meaning of treaties as documents of
sacred trust and protection. See Williams, supra note 24, at 991-97. At least
one scholar has expressed skepticism about the capacity of federal Indian law,
rooted as it is in colonial assumptions, to incorporate tribal jurisprudence.
See Frickey, supra note 37, at 1777-78.
49. Deloria has focused on the treaty process as a dynamic that preserved
the political status of Indian nations-not as a "ward" of the federal govern-
ment but as an equal contracting party. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to
Themselves: Treaties and The Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 963,
971-72 (1996).
50. Jo Carrillo has observed that "what shapes Native American con-
sciousness is the land." READINGS IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: RECALLING THE
RHYTHM OF SURVIVAL 2 (Jo Carrillo ed., 1998). Land, a "constitutive incom-
mensurable" for Indian people according to Carrillo, id. at 97-101, figures fun-
damentally in Indian history, culture, and contemporary life. The loss of land
is an experience common to tribes throughout the United States, whether by
means of European conquest, treaty abrogation, federal legislative preroga-
tive, or otherwise. The role of land or place in tribal cultures and the claims
of many tribes to sacred sites are aspects of Indianness that many non-
Indians find difficult to understand. See id. at 98.
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the heart of tribal legitimacy.51 The words of the Navajo Su-
preme Court are telling:
[Indian children] are not simply children in a general population, but
have special status as members of Indian tribes, and they are eligible
for the protection of those tribes and their traditional social struc-
tures. There is no resource more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of the Navajo Nation than our children. Consequently, we
have a special duty to ensure their protection and well-being.
52
Thus, from the perspective of Indian tribes, the power to re-
solve custody disputes involving Indian children is a core func-
tion of tribal sovereignty. The true test of that sovereign
power, moreover, is whether a tribe's custody decrees receive
respect outside the reservation.
H. RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS ACROSS STATE AND
RESERVATION BOUNDARIES
A. FuLL FAITH AND CREDIT AND THE DOCTRINE OF COMITY
The unique status of Indian tribes as domestic sover-
eigns-neither states nor foreign nations-has led to uncer-
tainty regarding the recognition owed to tribal and state judi-
cial decrees across reservation boundaries. 53 The uncertainty
springs from ambiguities surrounding the reach of the federal
full faith and credit mandate. By its terms, the constitutional
51. The unique importance of children to Indian tribes has been explicitly
recognized by Congress. In the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (1994)), Congress de-
scribed the relationship of children to tribal survival. "[Tihere is no resource,"
Congress wrote, "that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of
Indian tribes than their children." 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3).
52. In re Custody of S.R.T., 18 Indian L. Rptr. 6158, 6160 (Navajo Sup.
Ct. 1991) (citations omitted).
53. The topic of tribal-state judgment recognition has attracted consider-
able scholarly attention in recent years, a fact suggesting that tribal courts
are playing an increasingly visible role on the national scene. See P.S. Deloria
& Robert Laurence, Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agree-
ments: The Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA.
L. REV. 365 (1994); Fred L. Ragsdale, Jr., Problems in the Application of Full
Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REV. 133 (1977); Hon. Richard
E. Ransom et al., Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal Judgments: A
Roundtable Discussion of Law, Policy, and Practice, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
239 (1993) (discussion participants included the Hon. Christine Zuni, P.S.
Deloria, Robert N. Clinton, Robert Laurence, Nell Jessup Newton, M.E. Oc-
chialino, Jr.) [hereinafter Roundtable]; William V. Vetter, Of Tribal Courts




Full Faith and Credit Clause applies only to the states,54 but
the implementing statute is somewhat broader. In 28 U.S.C. §
1738, Congress provided in part that the judicial proceedings of
any court of "any... State, Territory or Possession... shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have
by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Posses-
sion from which they are taken."55 Thus, section 1738, unlike
its originating clause in the Constitution, imposes the full faith
and credit obligation on federal as well as state courts and ex-
tends the cloak of full faith and credit to decrees from federal
territories and possessions.
Despite its breadth, neither the language nor the history of
the statutory full faith and credit command reveals an intent
to extend the full faith and credit obligation to tribal court
judgments or to tribal courts. 56 It is improbable that the
Framers of the Constitution or the first Congress had tribal
courts in mind-either as the rendering court or the receiving
court-when they required every court in the United States to
give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of the
54. The constitutional mandate is simply that "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of
every other State." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. The Supreme Court has de-
scribed the clause as a "nationally unifying force," one that altered "the status
of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties... and [made]
them integral parts of a single nation." Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co.,
296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935). By including the strongly worded guarantee in
the Constitution, the Framers intended to assure "that the United States
would have the unity of one nation instead of being thirteen (or fifty) separate
little nations." ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CoNFLIcTs LAw Ch.9, §
73, at 215 (4th ed. 1986). For a recent reexamination of the purposes behind
the clause, see Rex Glensy, Note, The Extent of Congress' Power Under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 137, 151-56 (1997).
55. Act of May 26, 1790, Pub. L. No. 105-220, 1 Stat. 122 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738) (emphasis added).
56. The Supreme Court has stated that the specific purpose of the statute
was "to insure that federal courts, not included within the constitutional pro-
vision, would be bound by state judgments." Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 484 n.24 (1982) (citing Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40
(1938)). The legislative history of the statute is sparse and reveals no refer-
ence to Indian tribal courts. See George P. Costigan, Jr., The History of the
Adoption of Section 1 of Article IV of the United States Constitution and a
Consideration of the Effect on Judgments of That Section and of Federal Legis-
lation, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 470, 470-76 (1904); Willis L. M. Reese & Vincent A.




courts of any "State, Territory, or Possession."57 In the late
eighteenth century, Indian tribes had mechanisms of dispute
resolution that were unlikely to be viewed as judicial systems
by the drafters of the federal judicial code. Traditional dispute
resolution often fell within the authority of the tribal chief, a
council of elders or warrior society leaders, or the religious
leaders-not a judicial body in the modem sense-and the
process typically was one of mediation rather than adjudica-
tion.58 More importantly, Congress itself has indicated that it
does not view territories and possessions as synonymous with
tribes.5 9 In numerous enactments in the modem era, Congress
has explicitly extended full faith and credit to certain tribal
court proceedings,60 often by listing "Indian tribes" in addition
to "territories and possessions" as covered categories. 61 Such
designations, unless meaningless, show that Congress views
Indian tribes as falling into a unique category, outside the gen-
eral command of full faith and credit.
The United States Supreme Court has never directly held
that tribes are territories or possessions within the meaning of
the full faith and credit statute, but it held in an early case
that the Cherokee Nation was a "territory" within the meaning
of a federal statute governing testamentary appointments,62
57. See Roundtable, supra note 53, at 249 (statement of Robert Laurence).
58. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 44, at 111-13.
59. Accord Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1516 (1998).
60. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, codified in part at 25 U.S.C. §
1911(d) (1994) (requiring full faith and credit to tribal court child custody de-
crees); Violence Against Women Act, codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 2265
(requiring full faith and credit to tribal court orders of protection for victims of
domestic violence); Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1738B(b) (defining "State" to include "Indian country").
61. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (extending full faith and credit obligation to
"every State, every territory or possession of the United States, and every In-
dian tribe").
62. In United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 103-05
(1855), the Supreme Court construed an 1812 statute that required the Dis-
trict of Columbia to recognize testamentary appointments from states or ter-
ritories of the United States. The Court concluded that the Cherokee Nation
was a "territory" for purposes of the statute, emphasizing that the Cherokees
were "more advanced in civilization than the other Indian tribes, with the ex-
ception, perhaps, of the Choctaws." Id. at 102, 104. In light of subsequent de-
velopments, the Mackey Court's desire to give respect to the testamentary ap-
pointments of an especially "civilized" tribe seems a very thin reed upon which
to build the edifice of full faith and credit to tribal court judgments. In con-
trast, in New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468, 474-75 (1909), the
Court cited with approval Ex Parte Morgan, 20 F. 298, 305 (W.D. Ark. 1883),
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thus leading a few state courts to conclude that a similar con-
struction is required in section 1738.63 More recently, the
Court stated ambiguously in dicta that "in some circum-
stances" tribal decrees have been entitled to full faith and
credit.64  On the other hand, the modem Court's prudential
doctrine requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies before resort
to federal court is flatly inconsistent with any notion of full
faith and credit to tribal judgments. 65 If full faith and credit
were applicable to tribal judgments, a tribal court's determina-
tion of its own jurisdiction would be binding on all other
courts. 66 In contrast, the exhaustion doctrine envisions that a
party dissatisfied with the tribe's jurisdictional ruling can ar-
gue the question anew in a federal forum.67
The scholarly literature reveals a debate about the conse-
quences of particular approaches for tribal sovereignty. Some
commentators advance a full faith and credit approach to
tribal-state recognition of judgments, while others prefer to
rely on the doctrine of comity.68 The proponents of a full faith
in which the district court held that the Cherokee Nation was not a "territory"
within the meaning of the federal extradition statute.
63. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho 1982) (relying on
Mackey, 59 U.S. at 104, to conclude that tribes are "territories" within the
meaning of § 1738); Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975)
(citing Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941)) (same,
but suggesting that full faith and credit to foreign law is not "an inexorable
and unqualified command"); In re Adoption of Buehl, 555 P.2d 1334, 1342
(Wash. 1976) (relying without analysis on precedent of Jim decision).
64. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65-66 & n.21 (1978)
(citing Mackey).
65. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845,
856-57 (1985) (requiring federal court to abstain from deciding extent of tribal
court jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants until tribal courts have decided
the issue); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987) (extending
National Farmers Union to diversity cases involving non-Indian defendants).
66. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115-16 (1963).
67. Professor Williams has strongly criticized the subordination inherent
in federal court review of tribal court decisions, contending that such review
reveals the "legacy of European 'racism and imperialism.'" Williams, supra
note 27, at 276. For an analysis of the tribal exhaustion doctrine and a pro-
posal for the creation of a procedure to remove suits from federal to tribal
courts, see Melissa L. Koehn, Civil Jurisdiction: The Boundaries Between
Federal and Tribal Courts, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 705, 713-67 (1997).
68. In this debate, advocates of a uniform neutral acceptance of tribes as
sovereigns are pitted against those who emphasize the unique status of tribes,
individually and generically. According to two proponents of the latter view,
we do not believe that the national interests that drive uniform state-
to-state full faith and credit apply to state-to-state or tribe-to-state
enforcement concerns. The United States is made up of a relatively
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and credit view seem motivated more by policy concerns than
by solid historical evidence, with one respected Indian law
scholar explicitly urging a categorical full faith and credit posi-
tion as a means of bringing tribes into the American federal
system as full sovereign participants.69 Although most com-
mentators embrace the goal of enhancing the inter-system rec-
ognition of tribal judgments, they find insufficient historical
evidence to construe section 1738 as applying to Indian
tribes.70 Rather than rely on a uniform federal mandate, a few
scholars have encouraged individual tribes and states to nego-
tiate cooperative agreements for judgment recognition. 71 Sev-
eral state legislatures, moreover, have addressed the matter of
tribal-state judgment recognition through codified law.7 2
small number of rather similar states .... The United States is also
made up of a relatively large number of rather dissimilar Indian
tribes, dissimilar to the states and to each other .... For the Con-
gress to legislate sisterhood among the tribes seems a rather pre-
sumptuous thing for a younger government to impose on its elders.
And for the Congress to legislate sisterhood between tribes and states
seems particularly unrealistic.
Deloria & Laurence, supra note 53, at 378-79 (citations omitted); see also
Roundtable, supra note 53, at 241-46 (arguing for an extension of reciprocal
full faith and credit obligations to tribes as a way of interweaving tribal gov-
ernments into the fabric of the federal union as sovereigns). For an argument
for asymmetric rule of judgment recognition as between state and tribal
courts to accommodate unique concerns of each forum, see id. at 248-49. For
an argument for a comity approach to judgment recognition to provide for in-
dividualized responses to different tribal settings, see id. at 250-54.
69. The primary proponent of an extension of the full faith and credit
mandate to include tribal decrees is Professor Robert Clinton. See Robert N.
Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 841,
897-921 (1990). Clinton argues in part that tribal courts must give full faith
and credit to state court judgments under section 1738 and that, to achieve
symmetry and to bring tribal courts fully into the federal union, state courts
should accord tribal decrees a similar recognition. Id. at 897-921. In support
of his argument, he relies heavily on the Mackey case. See id. at 903-08. One
of Clinton's apparent objectives is to ensure federal review. If the full faith
and credit statute applied to tribal judgments, then a state's refusal to recog-
nize a tribal judgment would present a federal question reviewable in theory
in the United States Supreme Court. See Roundtable, supra note 53, at 245-
46.
70. See, e.g., Deloria & Laurence, supra note 53, at 378-79.
71. See generally id. See also B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into
the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal
Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 457, 482-84 (1998).
72. Several state legislatures have been sympathetic to such arguments
and have addressed full faith and credit through codified law. See NEB. REv.
STAT. § 43-1504 (1993) (extending full faith and credit to Indian child custody
proceedings); OKLA STAT. tit. 12, § 728 (1997 Supp.) (permitting Supreme
Court of Oklahoma to issue standards for extending full faith and credit to
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Because of the historical inapplicability to Indian tribes of
the constitutional and federal statutory full faith and credit
command, 73 and in the absence of legislative guidance, most
state and tribal judges have turned to the doctrine of comity in
deciding what effect to give to the other sovereign's decrees.
Reasoning that tribes are not territories or possessions of the
United States within the meaning of the full faith and credit
statute, state courts have invoked comity to decide whether to
recognize a tribal decree.74 Likewise, tribal courts have pre-
ferred comity to full faith and credit in addressing state court
orders, in part because the obligations inherent in section 1738
can result in a diminution of tribal sovereignty.75
Comity, a doctrine historically invoked in the international
context, allows the courts of one state or jurisdiction to give ef-
fect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state out of
deference and mutual respect.76 The traditional requirements
tribal court decrees, conditional on reciprocal recognition from tribal courts);
WIS. STAT. § 806.245(l)(e) (1997 Supp.) (granting full faith and credit to
judgments from Indian tribal courts in Wisconsin); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-
111(a)(iv) (1997) (granting full faith and credit to identified tribal courts); see
also S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 1-1-25(2)(b) (1992) (setting standards for extension
of "comity" to tribal court judgments); Pat Doyle, Judges Ponder Writing State
Rule to Enforce Tribal Court Orders, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 4, 1998,
at Al (reporting on efforts by Indian tribes in Minnesota to persuade state
judges to adopt a rule giving presumptive enforceability to tribal court orders
in state court).
73. Professor Clinton, while conceding that Indian tribes were not in the
minds of the drafters of section 1738, has argued that the plain meaning of
the statute requires that tribal courts give full faith and credit to federal and
state court judgments, and that symmetry and common sense should require
that tribal judgments be extended full faith and credit. See Roundtable, supra
note 53, at 243.
74. See, e.g., Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1977); Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d 512 (Mont. 1982); Fredericks v.
Eide-Kirschmann Ford, Mercury, Lincoln, Inc., 462 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1990);
In re Marriage of Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918 (Or. Ct. App. 1975). The federal
courts likewise have typically employed comity in deciding what effect to give
to a tribal decree. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir.
1997) (explaining that federal courts should recognize and enforce tribal de-
crees so long as the decree rests on adequate personal and subject-matter ju-
risdiction, the litigants were afforded due process, and the decree does not
violate the forum's public policy).
75. See Jones, supra note 71, at 481; B.J. Jones, Tribal Considerations in
Comity and Full Faith and Credit, 68 N.D. L. REV. 689 (1992) (exploring the
applicability of full faith and credit to tribal decrees from the perspective of
tribal courts).
76. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 165 (1895) (finding that com-
ity is voluntary recognition of another nation's laws, "promot[ing] justice be-
tween individuals, and... produc[ing] a friendly intercourse between the soy-
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of the doctrine are that the foreign court have had jurisdiction
over the subject-matter and the parties, that the litigants were
afforded fundamental due process, and that the judgment did
not violate a fundamental public policy of the forum.77 In ap-
plying comity to tribal judgments, state courts have tended to
apply the requirements of the traditional doctrine78 but some
have adopted a decidedly deferential attitude towards tribal
authority. As one state supreme court put it, "[wle consider an
'Indian nation' as equivalent to a 'foreign nation' to encourage
reciprocal action by the Indian tribes in this state and, ulti-
mately, to better relations between the tribes and the State."79
Numerous state courts have employed the doctrine of
comity in the context of child custody litigation.80 In so doing,
ereignties to which they belong").
77. See generally RESTATEMENT THIRD OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 482(2) (1986); EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 996-99, 1014-17 (2d ed. 1992).
78. See, e.g., Wells v. Wells, 451 N.W.2d 402, 403 (S.D. 1990) (explaining
that comity governs the question of recognition of tribal court orders, and that
the burden of proof is on the party seeking to enforce the order).
79. Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, 462 N.W.2d 164, 168 (N.D.
1990). In Fredericks, the court held that comity governed the enforcement of
a tribal money judgment and that the judgment carried a presumption of ju-
risdiction over the cause and the parties. See id. at 171. The court so held
even though the North Dakota legislature had required its state courts to en-
force other kinds of tribal judgments but had not required enforcement of the
judgment in question. See id. at 169. The North Dakota Supreme Court rea-
soned that the statutory requirements did not limit its discretion "to volun-
tarily recognize and enforce tribal court judgments as a matter of comity."
Id.; see also In re Marriage of Skillen, 956 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1998) (announcing a
highly deferential doctrine of comity to respect a broad sphere of tribal court
authority), discussed infra at notes 234-43 and accompanying text. Interest-
ingly, in the Ninth Circuit's recent explication of the doctrine of comity toward
tribal judgments, it stated that more deference was owed to tribal courts than
to the courts of foreign nations, but its application of the doctrine revealed
that even a "special comity" does not guarantee recognition of tribal decrees.
See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that tribal
court lacked jurisdiction over an action arising from a collision occurring on a
federal highway within reservation and that the resulting tribal judgment was
not entitled to recognition).
80. See, e.g., Leon v. Numkena, 689 P.2d 566, 569 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that principle of comity required Hopi divorce and custody order to be
recognized by state court); In re Custody of K.IKS., 508 N.W.2d 813, 816
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that state court should defer to tribal jurisdic-
tion as a matter of respect for the tribal forum); In re Marriage of Red Fox,
542 P.2d 918, 920 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (comparing tribal decree to foreign
judgment in holding that tribal decree was conclusive on the merits); In re
Custody of Sengstock, 477 N.W.2d 310, 314-15 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that comity should be extended to temporary custody order of tribal court).
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the courts analyze the competing jurisdictional standards for
state courts and tribal courts. As a function of their status as
dependent sovereigns, Indian tribes maintain broad powers of
self-government over reservation activities, including adjudica-
tory power over the domestic relations of tribal members, un-
less Congress has legislated otherwise.81 In an earlier work, I
explored jurisdictional conflicts between states and Indian
tribes in child custody disputes primarily from the perspective
of Anglo-American jurisdictional law.8 2 In that project I sug-
gested guidelines for state and tribal courts to follow in re-
solving jurisdictional battles, guidelines that prioritized, albeit
with great caution, the role of tribal courts where the child at
the center of the custody dispute had significant connections
with the tribe.83 My recommendations were shaded by my per-
ception that the biases of the Anglo-American judiciary can
emerge most acutely in disputes involving children of an In-
dian parent and a non-Indian parent where the two cultures
8L See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142-43
(1980). In the 1950s in the heyday of federal termination policy, Congress
transferred civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations to six
states and allowed other states to assume such jurisdiction by legislative ac-
tion. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 280-505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953). With
the advent of the era of self-determination, the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act
repealed that portion of Public Law 280 that permitted states to unilaterally
assume jurisdiction over Indian lands, and it thereafter required the affected
tribe to consent to the state assumption ofjurisdiction. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321,
1322, 1326 (1994). Without a proper assumption of state authority, the Civil
Rights Act provides for exclusive tribal jurisdiction over civil claims arising on
a reservation to which Indians are parties. See Kennerly v. Dist. Ct., 400 U.S.
423, 425-26 (1971). Because the ambiguities of civil jurisdiction under Public
Law 280 are beyond the scope of this Article, see generally Carole Goldberg,
Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22
UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975), I focus on the legal relations between states and
tribes where there has been no assumption of jurisdiction by a state over a
reservation under Public Law 280.
82. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Fighting over Indian Children: The Uses
and Abuses of Jurisdictional Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L. RsV. 1051 (1989).
83. See id. at 1099-107. The recommendation for a preferred tribal role
was for cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of state and tribal courts, i.e.,
where the child and a contestant had significant connections with both sover-
eigns. The recommendation rested, in part, on the "federal policy that tribal
courts play a paramount role in resolving questions relating to the disposition
of Indian children." Id. at 1106. Quite recently, such a policy was explicitly
embraced by the Montana Supreme Court. See Skillen, 956 P.2d at 17
(announcing a rule of exclusive jurisdiction where Indian child and at least
one Indian parent reside on reservation, and requiring discretion that is sen-
sitive to the child's cultural identity where concurrent jurisdiction exists).
[Vol. 83:927948
IDENTITYAND ASSIMILATION
can each claim ownership of the child's future welfare.84 Al-
though my recommendations were aimed ostensibly at tribes
and states, the primary thrust was towards building a respect
for tribal authority among the state judiciaries.85
In my analysis, I was heavily influenced by the federal
policy of protecting the tribal role in proceedings involving In-
dian children-a policy derived from well-established tenets of
federal Indian law jurisprudence.8 6 In Fisher v. District Court,87
for example, the Supreme Court established a rule of exclusive
tribal court jurisdiction over the domestic relations of tribal
members who are domiciled on the reservation. Conceding
that many litigated disputes involving the custody of Indian
84. The bias of Anglo-American courts against tribal decisionmakers may
have been at work in a recent controversial decision in California under the
Indian Child Welfare Act. See In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that IOWA does not allow belated attack on adoption of
child where child lacks significant ties to tribe). The case pitted adoption ad-
vocates against Native American activists who wanted to protect the chil-
dren's affiliation with their tribe. See James Rainey, Declaring Truce in
Adoption Fight, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1997, at Al.
85. In contrast to my earlier study, this Article explores the tribes' own
definitions of their jurisdiction in child custody cases and the implications of
such jurisdictional rules for tribal identity. My particular concern here is the
way in which Anglo-American jurisdictional standards may eclipse traditional
sources of tribal power.
86. In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), for example, the Court held
that state courts had no jurisdiction over litigation brought against a Navajo
couple based on a debt that arose on the Navajo Reservation. Id. at 222-23.
According to Williams, the test of state court authority is "whether the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them." Id. at 220. The Court explained that "to allow the ex-
ercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal
courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the
Indians to govern themselves." Id. at 223.
87. 424 U.S. 382 (1976). The Supreme Court held that a tribe's jurisdic-
tion to determine custody of an Indian child, in a dispute between the child's
Indian mother and an Indian foster mother, was exclusive. See id. at 389.
The Court reasoned that the state court's exercise of jurisdiction "plainly
would interfere" with the tribe's powers of self-government. Id. at 387. Some
tribes have codified this notion in their own domestic relations codes. See
TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE LAC COURTE OREILLES BAND OF LAKE
SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA INDIANS tit. X, § 10.002 (1982) (refusing to recognize a
divorce obtained outside the reservation where both parties to the marriage
were domiciled on the reservation at the time the proceeding for divorce was
commenced). Significantly, Fisher was cited with approval in Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), as an illustration of a necessary corollary of
tribal sovereignty-that a tribe has the power to exercise jurisdiction over




children will not fall within Fisher's category of exclusive tribal
jurisdiction, I advocated a comity-style deference to tribal
courts where concurrent jurisdiction in a state and a tribe ex-
ists.8 8 I relied additionally on the federal policy embodied in
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,89 a policy that recognizes
a paramount tribal role in determining the best interests of In-
dian children.90 Although the ICWA by its own terms governs
adoptive, pre-adoptive, and foster-care placements and has no
applicability to custody disputes between parents,91 the Act
evinces a federal policy that can inform judge-made doctrines
of comity when non-ICWA custody disputes involving Indian
children arise. Recent case law suggests that state courts are
increasingly willing to endorse such a doctrine of comity that
accommodates a preferred tribal role in adjudications affecting
Indian children. 92
B. APPLYING FEDERAL OR UNIFORM STATE JURISDICTIONAL
PRINCIPLES TO TRIBAL COURTS
The topic of tribal court power over children is particularly
timely because of the efforts of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to fashion a new and
improved Uniform Act regarding child custody jurisdiction.
88. See Atwood, supra note 82, at 1099-107.
89. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-23 (1994).
90. Under the ICWA, tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who "resides or is domiciled
within the reservation" or who has been declared a ward of the tribal court.
Id. § 1911(a). A form of presumptive tribal jurisdiction exists for custody pro-
ceedings involving other Indian children "in the absence of good cause to the
contrary," subject to veto by a parent or declination by a tribe. Id. § 1911(b).
The interpretation of "good cause" in the state courts to defeat a transfer of
jurisdiction to tribal court has been the subject of considerable controversy.
See Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Ju-
risdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWAL. REV. 585 (1994).
91. Under the Act, "child custody proceeding" does not include "an award,
in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the parents." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
92. See In re Marriage of Skillen, 956 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1998), discussed infra
at notes 234-43 and accompanying text; see also In re Custody of KK.S., 508
N.W.2d 813, 817 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that state court should de-
cline jurisdiction in favor of tribal court where state and tribe shared concur-
rent jurisdiction over custody dispute involving Indian child). At least one
commentator has expressed optimism for the doctrine of comity as a way for
state courts to give appropriate deference to tribal courts in areas of uniquely
tribal concern and has seen "no examples of arbitrariness or otherwise show-
ing any lack of respect for the tribal court systems." See Roundtable, supra
note 53, at 254 (comments by Professor Nell Jessup Newton).
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Three decades ago, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) was promulgated by the Conference as a means of in-
troducing finality and consistency into the post-decree world of
children of divorce. 93 One of the most innovative contributions
of the UCCJA was the factual predicate for a state court's exer-
cise of jurisdiction in child custody cases. The UCCJA an-
nounced in pragmatic terms the two major bases for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction: home state jurisdiction, where the child and
a contestant had lived for six consecutive months,94 and signifi-
cant connection jurisdiction, where the child and a contestant
have a significant connection with the state and substantial
evidence is available in the state concerning the child's welfare
such that it is in the child's best interests for the state to exer-
cise jurisdiction.95
The concept of domicile is noticeably absent from the
UCCJA model. According to the Commissioners, the six-month
period for home state jurisdiction was selected "in order to
have a definite and certain test which is at the same time
based on a reasonable assumption of fact."96 They went on to
93. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act was approved by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1968. See
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 116 (1988) (Historical
Note). The history of child custody jurisdiction has been recounted many
times elsewhere and is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally Anne B.
Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child. A Critical Reexamination of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 845 (1992).
94. According to the Act, jurisdiction exists if "this State (i) is the home
state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had
been the child's home state within 6 months before commencement of the pro-
ceeding and.., a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this
State." UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3(a)(1), 9 U.LA_ at 143.
The Act defines "home state" as the state where the child lived with his par-
ents or a person acting as parent for at least six consecutive months. See id. §
2(5).
95. The Act provides that jurisdiction exists if:
[11t is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State as-
sume jurisdiction because (i) the child and ... at least one contestant,
have a significant connection with this State, and (ii) there is avail-
able in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's present
or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
Id. § 3(a)(2). Although the Commissioners considered home state and signifi-
cant connection to be the two major bases for jurisdiction, the Act also recog-
nizes jurisdiction in a state where the child is present and state action is nec-
essary on an emergency basis, or where no other state has jurisdiction or is
willing to exercise it, and the child's best interests would be served by the ex-
ercise ofjurisdiction. See id. § 3(a)(3)-(4).
96. Id. § 3 cmt.
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quote the work of an influential scholar regarding that factual
assumption: "Most American children are integrated into an
American community after living there six months; conse-
quently this period of residence would seem to provide a rea-
sonable criterion for identifying the established home."97 The
Commissioners thus favored the concrete and certain test of a
child's actual residence over the intangible and less definite
concept of domicile.
The UCCJA's effort to eliminate uncertainty and unpre-
dictability in child custody jurisdiction was widely praised as
an immense improvement over the ambiguity of the common
law and was ultimately adopted in some form by every state.98
The Act had its critics, however, many of whom focused on the
continuing unpredictability of "significant connection" jurisdic-
tion and the failure of the Commissioners to explicitly priori-
tize "home state" jurisdiction.99 In 1980, Congress entered the
interstate custody domain by enacting the Parental Kidnap-
ping Prevention Act (PKPA)100 pursuant to its powers under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In the PKPA, Congress cre-
ated a federal command for recognition and enforcement of
child custody decrees from state to state by endorsing the ju-
risdictional model of the UCCJA and strengthening it in cer-
tain important respects. For present purposes, the most nota-
ble difference was that the PKPA prioritized "home state"
jurisdiction and created the concept of exclusive continuing ju-
risdiction. 101 Under the framework of the PKPA, a state quali-
fying as a child's "home state" has primary jurisdiction and
only if there is no home state may a state with "significant
connection" jurisdiction entertain a custody dispute.10 2 Addi-
tionally, in an attempt to avoid later disputes about modifica-
97. Id. (quoting Leonard Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62
MICH. L. REV. 795, 818 (1964)). Professor Ratner cited no studies in support
of his assumption about a child's integration into a community.
98. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. at 115-16
(Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted).
99. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 93; Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Progress
Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining Problems:
Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65 CAL. L. REV.
978 (1977).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
101. See id. § 1738A(c)(2) (setting out categories of initial jurisdiction); id.
§ 1738A(d) (creating exclusive continuing jurisdiction).
102. See id. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(i) (conditioning significant connection juris-
diction on there being no home state).
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tion of custody decrees, Congress gave the issuing state con-
tinuingjurisdiction under certain circumstances.1 03
Neither the UCCJA nor the federal statute refers to cus-
tody disputes arising in tribal courts. In each statute, the defi-
nition of "state" includes the familiar list: a state, territory, or
possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, and
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 04 In construing the UCCJA,
most state courts have held that custody decrees from Indian
tribal courts are not within the purview of the Act, but at least
one has ruled that "state" includes Indian tribes under the
Act.105 Of course, a state judiciary can give whatever meaning
it wants to words in a state statute, subject to legislative over-
ride. With respect to the PEPA, on the other hand, all courts
must attempt to be faithful to the congressional intent under-
lying the federal enactment and in this case it does not appear
that Congress's intent was to include the tribes. The legisla-
tive history of the PKPA does not suggest that Congress con-
sidered Indian tribes to fall within the statutory definition of
"state."10 6 Further, because contemporaneous federal legisla-
tion explicitly addressed Indian tribes,107 Congress's failure to
103. See id § 1738A(d) (granting continuing exclusive jurisdiction to issu-
ing state so long as it continues to have jurisdiction under its own laws and
remains the residence of the child or any contestant).
104. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 2(10), 9 U.L.A. at 142;
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(8).
105. Compare Harris v. Young, 473 N.W.2d 141 (S.D. 1991) (finding that
the UCCJA is not literally applicable to Indian tribes), In re Custody of Seng-
stock, 477 N.W.2d 310 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (same), and Byzewski v. Byzewski,
429 N.W.2d 394 (N.D. 1988) (same), with Martinez v. Superior Court, 731
P.2d 1244 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that UCCJA requires recognition
of tribal decree).
106. See generally Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979, Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judi-
ciary and the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-16 (1980) (statement of
Sen. Wallop) (explaining the problem of interstate child custody enforcement
and the need for a federal law requiring state court recognition of sister state
decrees). Although Senator Wallop, who introduced the legislation in the
Senate, alluded to the difficulties of enforcing custody decrees across interna-
tional borders, he did not mention the question of tribal-state enforcement.
See id. at 9-10, 16.
107. The PKPA was originally appended to the Domestic Violence Preven-
tion and Services Act. While that Act explicitly included Indian tribes in its
program of domestic violence prevention, see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-1401, at
4, 30, 39 (1980), the PKPA ultimately became detached from the legislative
proposal and was enacted separately. The domestic violence legislation did
not become law until 1984 as Public Law 98-457. For a comprehensive discus-
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do so in the PKPA cannot be deemed an oversight. Notwith-
standing the vigorous advocacy of at least one prominent
scholar, 108 very few courts have concluded that the Act applies
literally to Indian tribes. 09
In 1997, the Commissioners promulgated a significantly
revised custody act-the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The primary aim of the
drafters was to incorporate the stricter jurisdictional standards
of the PKPA into a model state law.110 Thus, the new Act pri-
oritizes home state jurisdiction"I and includes other provisions
intended to clarify jurisdictional standards and to provide uni-
form procedures for interstate enforcement of custody de-
crees.112 Most significantly for purposes of this Article, the new
Act-unlike either the original UCCJA or the federal PKPA-
also mentions Indian tribes.
In section 104, the Act addresses two potential conflicts be-
tween the jurisdiction of state and tribal courts. 13 First, in
section 104(a), the Act excludes proceedings governed by the
Indian Child Welfare Act-a statement of principle that would
be compelled in any event by the Supremacy Clause. Subparts
(b) and (c) of section 104, enclosed in the Commissioners'
brackets, provide for the potential applicability of the Act to
Indian tribes. The subparts announce that the state shall treat
sion of the legislative history, see Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Indian L. Rptr.
6059, 6063-65 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1997). With due respect to the
conclusion reached in Eberhard, this author sees no support in the legislative
history for the conclusion that Congress intended to reach Indian tribes in the
PKPA.
108. See Clinton, supra note 69, at 854.
109. Compare In re Larch, 872 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that the
Cherokee Nation is a "state" within meaning of PKPA), and Eberhard, 24 In-
dian L. Rptr. at 6067 (arguing that tribes are "states" within meaning of
PKPA), with DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510 (8th Cir.
1989) (determining that the question of applicability of PKPA to Indian tribes
remsains unresolved), In re Marriage of Skillen, 956 P.2d at 10 (explaining that
the policy underlying the PKPA, but not the literal language, extends to tribal
decrees), and Sengstock, 477 N.W.2d at 310 (arguing that PKPA does not ex-
tend to tribal decrees).
110. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9
U.LA 238 (Supp. 1998) (Prefatory Note).
111. See id. § 201.
112. The Act, for example, eliminates consideration of a child's best inter-
ests in determining whether significant connection jurisdiction exists, id., de-
fines exclusive continuing jurisdiction for modification purposes, id.§ 202, and
prescribes enforcement procedures, id. §§ 301-17.
113. See id. § 104.
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a tribe as if it were a state of the United States for purposes of
the Act," 4 and that the state must recognize and enforce "a
child-custody determination made by a tribe under factual cir-
cumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional
standards of this [Act]."115 The comment cursorily explains
that the section "allows states the discretion to extend the
terms of this Act to Indian tribes by removing the brackets."" 6
The comment also makes clear that the Act does not purport to
legislate custody jurisdiction for tribal courts. Rather, a tribe
is free to decide whether to adopt the jurisdictional standards
set forth in the Act. The advantage for the tribe of such an
adoption is the recognition and enforcement of tribal judg-
ments, at least by those states that have adopted the sections
of the Act applicable to tribes.
The fact that the Commissioners chose to bracket subparts
(b) and (c) and to use decidedly neutral language in the com-
ment suggests that they were ambivalent about the inclusion
of Indian tribes. Noticeably absent is any statement of sub-
stantive policy or any recognition that tribal-state custody con-
flicts pose a significant or unique problem. The Drafting
Committee's original inclination was to define the term "state"
to include Indian tribes. Debate on that proposal, however, re-
vealed significant variations among the states on how to regard
tribal judgments.1 7 Because of those variations, the Drafting
Committee determined that the extension of the Act to Indian
tribes should remain optional for each state.11 8
Even the Commissioners' equivocal invitation to extend
the UCCJEA to Indian tribes will most likely be applauded by
many family law scholars and some Indian law scholars." 9
Surely, the argument goes, a provision for potentially including
114. See id. § 104(b); supra note 4 (quoting the full text of section 104(b)).
115. Id. § 104(c).
116. Id. § 104 cmt.
117. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, 1996 ANNUAL MEETING TRANSCRIPT 17-26 (statements of Comm'r
Daykin of Nev. and Comm'r Peterson of Alaska).
118. See Robert G. Spector, Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and En-
forcement Act (with Prefatory Note and Comments), 32 FAM L.Q. 303, 323 n.42
(1998). Professor Spector was the reporter for the Drafting Committee for the
Act.
119. One can safely assume that Professor Robert Clinton will welcome the
inclusion of Indian tribes in the new UCCJEA, since he achieved substantially
the same result in his capacity as associate tribal justice in Eberhard v. Eber-
hard, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1997). See in-
fra notes 217-33 and accompanying text.
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Indian tribes within the scope of the new Uniform Act is an
improvement over the complete silence of the original UCCJA.
If tribes are included as "states" within the meaning of the new
Act, then Indian children will benefit at last from the predict-
ability and consistency offered by uniform law because state
court recognition and enforcement of tribal child custody de-
crees will be more likely. Moreover, the UCCJEA's mention of
Indian tribes is a bow, even if bracketed, towards tribal sover-
eignty. Proponents of section 104 can maintain that including
tribal judgments within the Uniform Act's cooperative model is
a way of bringing Indian tribes into the federal system on a par
with the states.
The applause, however, should be tempered. While a
state's adoption of section 104 may extend a measure of sover-
eignty to tribes, it may also extract a measure of cultural integ-
rity in return. Section 104 does not guarantee recognition of
all tribal custody decrees. A state court's willingness to enforce
a tribal decree under the UCCJEA depends on a finding by the
state court that the tribal decree was issued in "substantial
conformity" with the new Act's jurisdictional prerequisites.
Accordingly, enforcement of another sovereign's decree is not
required if the rendering court acted inconsistently with the
jurisdictional principles of the Act.120 In other words, the clear
thrust of the new UCCJEA is that Indian tribes who adopt and
adhere to the jurisdictional provisions of the Act-the priori-
tized "home state" and the secondary "significant connection"
jurisdictional categories-will receive recognition of their de-
crees in Anglo-American courts. Conversely, Indian tribes who
do not choose to so "Anglicize" their tribal codes run the risk
that Anglo-American courts will view their custody decrees as
lacking in legal force. The carrot of recognition is attained
through the stick of assimilation.
120. State courts, for example, have refused to defer to the custody rulings
of other states where the rendering state acted according to jurisdictional
standards that departed from the terms of the UCCJA. See, e.g., O'Neal v.
O'Neal, 329 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Iowa 1983) (holding that an Arizona custody de-
cree, issued on the basis of the child's domicile in Arizona, was not entitled to
recognition under the UCCJA). The court noted that Arizona's inclusion of
domicile as a jurisdictional base was a "substantial departure from the
UCCJA." Id. at 668; see also Pasqualone v. Pasqualone, 406 N.E.2d 1121,
1127 (Ohio 1980) (Ohio not bound to honor Illinois decree because Illinois
omitted "important" UCCJA sections); cf. In re Marriage of DesJarlait, 379
N.W.2d 139, 145 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction in
custody dispute was improper and did not strip state court of power to act).
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Thus, in the arena of tribal-state custody disputes, there
are significant differences between the comity-based approach
to resolving jurisdictional competition and the statutory man-
date contemplated by the UCCJEA. Each approach has its ad-
vantages and disadvantages. A comity-based approach allows
for the exercise of discretion-a judicial freedom that can lead
to the dangerous interplay of a judge's subjective biases. If a
state court or tribal court is hostile to the other's exercise of
authority, the malleability of the doctrine of comity can be
misused.121 On the other hand, a comity-based approach per-
mits judges to tailor their decisions to the unique context of
tribal-state conflicts. In the child custody context, federal In-
dian law principles and federal policy recognizing the impor-
tance of Indian children to tribal integrity can combine to pro-
duce a special comity that is highly sensitive to the tribal role.
In contrast, a uniform statutory approach such as that
suggested in section 104 of the UCCJEA would simply treat
tribes as states. Neutral jurisdictional rules would be applied
across the board to tribes and states, without regard to the
unique nature of tribal sovereignty or the significance of a
child's tribal membership. Concededly, in some cases the ex-
tension of the UCCJEA to tribes would result in enhancing the
status of tribal decrees. Where a tribal decree rests on juris-
dictional foundations that are consistent with the Act, then it
would be statutorily entitled to recognition as a matter of state
law, and a state court would have no discretion to rule other-
wise. In other situations, however, the tribal decree might not
fare as well outside the reservation as it would have under a
sensitive application of comity. Nothing in the UCCJEA con-
templates a role of deference towards tribal courts in custody
disputes involving Indian children, and a tribal decree that
was based solely on tribal membership, for example, would not
qualify for enforcement under the Act. 22 Thus, while a statu-
tory mandate such as the UCCJEA removes the question of en-
forcement of custody decrees from the discretion of a judge, it
121. See, e.g., Barbry v. Dauzat, 576 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(rejecting tribe's definition of tribal membership and refusing to recognize le-
gitimacy of tribal custody decree). For a more extensive discussion of Barbry
v. Dauzat, see infra notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
122. See Spector, supra note 118, at 323 n.42 (stating that "[a] tribal cus-
tody determination that was based solely on tribal membership (a form of na-
tionality jurisdiction), without meeting the jurisdictional requirements of [the
Act] would not qualify for enforcement under this Act").
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also locks the judge into a set of jurisdictional standards that
can be unforgiving.
III. THE VOICE OF THE TRIBES
A. THE ROLE OF TRmAL CULTURE IN JUDIcIAL
DECISIONMAXING
The written laws of Indian tribes do not necessarily por-
tray the only authentic tribal voice. For most Indian tribes, the
customs and traditions that formed the legal framework of the
society historically were unwritten, and were passed on by oral
tradition and collective memory.1 23 Tribal codes and constitu-
tions are largely an innovation of the twentieth century with
many appearing after the passage of the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 (IRA).124 Although numerous Indian tribes created
governmental structures independent of federal policy, the
majority heeded the call of the IRA.125 The statute recognized
the authority of tribes to organize their governments, draft
their own constitutions, enact their own laws, and establish
their own court systems. The Bureau of Indian Affairs, how-
ever, did most of the drafting and produced "standard boiler-
plate" constitutions ... based on federal constitutional and
common law notions rather than on tribal customs."126 These
documents, in turn, were subject to the approval of the Secre-
tary of Interior, a signal of such subordinate status that some
tribes refused to participate. 27 As federal policy gradually
moved from a focus on the termination and assimilation of
123. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 10, at 103-12 (describing the power of
language, narrative, and myth in tribal culture); DELORIA & LYTLE, supra
note 44, at 82 (observing that written documents as governmental guidelines
were not found among most tribes, with the notable exception of the pre-
Columbian Iroquois Constitution).
124. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1994).
125. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 44, at 99-105.
126. COHEN, supra note 11, at 149.
127. During the two-year period provided by the IRA during which tribes
could indicate their acceptance of the federal reorganization, almost one-third
of the total Indian tribes recognized at that time rejected the statutory plan.
See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 44, at 100. The Navajo nation, widely
viewed as possessing the most sophisticated tribal court system in the coun-
try, did not establish its modem judicial system until 1959. See Tso, supra
note 10, at 230. Furthermore, even those tribes who organized under the IRA
have undergone a gradual "metamorphosis" such that their contemporary
governmental structures and legal systems are uniquely powerful. See
DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 44, at 105.
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tribes to the current approach of tribal self-determination, 128
Indian tribes revised and expanded their written laws. Con-
temporary tribal law reflects the amalgamated influence of
Anglo-American pressures toward conformity from the outside
as well as the force of the tribes' own identity emerging from
within.
While traditional methods of dispute resolution have pros-
pered in a few tribes, most notably the Iroquois Peacemakers'
Court and the religious courts of the Pueblos, most tribes have
developed court systems that blend Anglo-American proce-
dures with traditional cultural practices. 129 Most contemporary
tribal courts trace their origins to the Courts of Indian Of-
fenses, established in the late nineteenth century as a part of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs' assimilationist program for res-
ervations. 130 These courts, also known as "CFR courts" because
they operated under guidelines set forth in the Code of Federal
Regulations, have been characterized by critics as "instruments
of cultural oppression 131 because of their use of criminal sanc-
tions to impose dominant cultural norms on tribal peoples. 32
At their zenith, they operated on about two-thirds of all reser-
vations.33 With the enactment of the IRA, tribes began to es-
tablish their own judicial systems to enforce the new tribal
codes. These courts typically exercised civil as well as criminal
128. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing the chronology
of federal policy toward Indian tribes).
129. See DELORIA & LYrLE, supra note 44, at 113, 198-203 (noting the
greater informality of tribal court procedures, less reliance on strict rules of
evidence, and greater emphasis on mediation than adjudication); see also
Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons From the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal
Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1 (1997) (noting that tribal legal systems incorporate
traditional values and cooperative processes which can serve as models for
Anglo-American courts).
130. See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis, One Year in the Life of
Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 291 (1998); see also
DELORIA & LYrLE, supra note 44, at 113-16. The colonialist objective of these
courts is made clear in their description by a nineteenth century federal judge
as "mere educational and disciplinary instrumentalities by which the govern-
ment of the United States is endeavoring to improve and elevate the condition
of these dependent tribes to whom it sustains the relation of guardian."
United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888).
131. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 44, at 115.
132. See Newton, supra note 130, at 291.
133. See James R. Kerr, Constitutional Rights, Tribal Justice, and the




jurisdiction.134 While there are wide variations among today's
tribal courts, many tribes operate two-tiered judicial systems
with procedural rules patterned after the rules of the state in
which they are located. 35 Although tribal courts are generat-
ing a rich jurisprudence of their own,136 the courts still face
challenges to their legitimacy from tribal members who view
them as "white man's tools." 137 At the same time, they face
challenges to their legitimacy from outsiders (and some insid-
ers) who view them as an inferior system ofjustice 1 38
Some have praised the current state of tribal law as a
manifestation of the tribes' abilities to adapt to their "depend-
ent sovereign" status and to incorporate the contributions of
Anglo-American law in a uniquely Indian meld.139 According to
one commentator:
The law produced in tribal codes and courts does not necessarily re-
tain the discrete elements from Anglo-American legal culture with
the same meaning and value as in the contributor culture or juris-
prudence. In... tribal law... there is an innovative result that is
consistent with a pervasive characteristic of the indigenous nations:
the capacity to change as an evolving culture.Y4
Recognizing a poverty of theory about the nature of tribal sov-
ereignty, contemporary scholars of Indian law have urged
134. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 44, at 116.
135. See Newton, supra note 130, at 291-94. In several of the tribes lo-
cated in Arizona, for example, tribal codes have adopted procedures similar to
those governing the Arizona courts. See infra notes 197, 199-201 and accom-
panying text.
136. For a fascinating description of case law generated by twenty Indian
tribal courts over the course of a year, see Newton, supra note 130. The study
reveals the complexity of the issues faced by tribal judges, the sophistication
of their legal analysis, and the interplay of customary and traditional law in
the decisionmaking.
137. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 10, at 67 (observing that "many tribal
courts are vilified as 'white men's' creations flowing from the IRA and an en-
tire federal history directed to assimilation).
138. See Frank Pornmersheim & Terry Pechota, Tribal Immunity, Tribal
Courts, and the Federal System: Emerging Contours and Frontiers, 31 S.D. L.
REV. 553, 566-67, 575-76 (1986).
139. According to Chief Justice Tso of the Navajo Supreme Court:
A close look at the Navajo Tribal Government would reveal many
characteristics that appear to be Anglo in nature. Actually, many
concepts have their roots in our ancient heritage. Others are foreign
to our culture but have been accommodated in such a way that they
have become acceptable and useful to us.
Tso, supra note 10, at 231; see also Valencia-Weber, supra note 25, at 256
(praising the creative capacity of tribal courts, shown through the work of
"legal-warriors," who use the old to make new and distinctly Indian law).
140. See Valencia-Weber, supra note 25, at 256-57.
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tribes to draw creatively on their traditions to enrich and dis-
tinguish their own systems of tribal justice.141
Tribal courts bring to a legal dispute a dimension of dis-
pute resolution that is not available to the Anglo courts-the
method by which the tribe historically has made sense of its
place in the world. 42 This dimension includes customs re-
garding the role of extended family members in child rearing,
the respective roles of mothers and fathers, and the importance
of preserving knowledge of the tribe's history, spiritual prac-
tices, myths, art forms, or traditional ways of life.143 This di-
mension appears explicitly in many tribal codes and, even
without a code's allusion to customary law, tribal courts often
look to the traditions of their people in their decisionmaking.
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court eloquently described the
force of Navajo customary or "common law" in a recent opinion:
Navajo common law [or K'e] is the first law of our courts and we will
abide by it whenever possible .... K'e recognizes "your relations to
everything in the universe," in the sense that Navajos have respect
for others and for a decision made by the group. It is a deep feeling
for responsibilities to others and the duty to live in harmony with
them .... It is a deeply-felt emotion which is learned from childhood.
To maintain good relations and respect one another, Navajos must
abide by this principle of K'e.'"
141. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 17 (recommending renewed emphasis on
the Seneca tradition of Peacemaker in tribal dispute resolution); Pommer-
sheim, supra note 9 (envisioning greater use of traditional narrative and story
to "liberate" tribal court jurisprudence from its history of colonization). Ac-
cording to Deloria and Lytle, "[tihe greatest challenge faced by the modem
tribal court system is in the harmonizing of past Indian customs and tradi-
tions with the dictates of contemporary jurisprudence." DELORIA & LYrLE,
supra note 44, at 120.
142. Indian leaders have recognized that law reform within Indian com-
munities must build on the unique strengths of the indigenous cultures.
Judge Julian Pinkhan of the Yakama Tribal Children's Court recently urged
tribal judges across the nation to adopt a uniform children's code to address
child welfare needs among Indian communities. See Pinkham, supra note 1.
In his proposal for reform, Judge Pinkham deliberately drew on the tradi-
tional concern of the Yakima Tribe for the care of its children and for the
preservation of tribal culture through education of the young. See id; see also
Robert Yazzie, Life Comes from It: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV.
175, 180-87 (1994) (describing the unique concept of Navajo "horizontal" jus-
tice and its role in tribal adjudication); Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice
Systems and Tribal Society, 79 JUDICATURE 126 (1995) (describing the holistic
philosophy that typifies indigenous justice systems in contrast to the
"American" paradigm of justice).
143. See generally Newton, supra note 130, at 302-09.
144. Ben v. Burbank, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6001, 6001 (Navajo Sup. Ct. 1996).
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In a uniquely Navajo opinion, the court applied the principle of
harmonious living to resolve a question of contract law.
145
B. TRIBAL CULTURE IN FAMILY LAW ADJUDICATION
Tribal judges frequently utilize the customary or unwrit-
ten law to assist them in deciding disputes in the family law
arena.146 In domestic relations involving tribal members, each
tribe's culture can inform a court's approach to a case, ranging
from the Navajo's matrilineal society in which a woman's role
is revered,147 to the Santa Clara Pueblo's patrilineal definition
of tribal membership;148 from the Comanche custom of giving a
145. In Ben, the Navajo Supreme Court determined that an oral contract
between relatives was properly enforced by the tribe's small claims court,
without regard to any statute of limitations. Id. at 6002.
146. Then-Judge Tom Tso has explained the essential role of family and
clan in Navajo tradition:
It must also be understood that the Navajo clan system is very im-
portant, with a child being of the mother's clan and "born for" the fa-
ther's clan. The clan is important, and the family as an economic unit
is vital. The Navajo live together in family groups which can include
parents, children, grandparents, brothers and sisters, and all the
members of the family group have important duties to each other.
These duties are based on the need to survive and upon very impor-
tant religious values which command each to support each other and
the group.
In re Estate of Apachee, 4 Navajo Rptr. 178, 182 (Window Rock Dist. Ct.
1983); see also Ovah v. Coochyouma, 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6085, 6086-87 (Hopi
Tribal Ct. 1993) (describing the responsibility of villages within the Hopi Tribe
for resolving family disputes according to tradition); Davis v. Means, 21 In-
dian L. Rptr. 6125, 6127 (Navajo Sup. Ct 1994) (explaining the importance of
paternity determinations for the functioning of Navajo Nation's clan system).
147. See Navajo Nation v. Murphy, 15 Indian. L. Rptr. 6035, 6036 (Navajo
Sup. Ct. 1988) (rejecting the Anglo concept of coverture as a basis for marital
privilege, but sustaining the privilege on the basis of a need to preserve har-
mony). Other tribes, such as the Iroquois and many of the Pueblo tribes, are
also matrilineal. See JANE B. KATZ, I AM THE FIRE OF TIME 3 (1977); PAULA
GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED HOOP 209 (1986).
148. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). In Martinez,
the Supreme Court upheld Pueblo tribal law against an equal protection
challenge under the Indian Civil Rights Act that denied membership to a child
born to an enrolled mother and a nonmember father. Id. The same law
granted membership, however, to a child whose father was an enrolled mem-
ber and whose mother was not. See id. at 52-53. Martinez has generated a
rich scholarly debate about the clash of collective identity and individual
rights. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 63-69 (1987);
Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, supra note 42, at 514-33; Robert C. Jeffrey, Jr.,
The Indian Civil Rights Act and the Martinez Decision: A Reconsideration, 35
S.D. L. REV. 355 (1990); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes,
States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CmE. L. REV. 671 (1989). Other tribal
code provisions contain similar gender-based distinctions that would most
1999] IDENTITYAND ASSIMILATIOV 96
special parenting role to a child's paternal aunt,149 to the Dela-
ware Tribe's recognition of "the unique relationship that exists
between Indian grandparents and grandchildren."150 As ex-
plained by the Navajo Supreme Court: "The family is the core
of Navajo society. Thus, family cohesion is a fundamental
tenet of the Navajo people. It is Navajo customary law-Dine
Bi Beehaz'aaii-or Navajo common law. The Navajo Nation
courts must apply that tenet to disputes involving children un-
der the doctrine of parens patriae."151
Inevitably, a particular tribe's tradition on a family law
matter may diverge from that of the state. In particular, a
tribe's more fluid approach to responsibility for child-rearing
may contrast sharply with the Anglo-American concern for the
"legalistic parent and child relationship."15 2 The obligations of
likely fail under the United States Constitution's equal protection mandate.
See, e.g., SALT RIVER COMMUNITY CODE § 10-16 (1981) (setting out as a ground
for divorce a husband's failure to support his wife but omitting a wife's failure
to support her husband); GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY CODE § 6.110 (1960)
(same); LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH &
OURAY RESERVATION UTAH § 5-3-9 (1988) (requiring that tribal courts con-
sider "the natural presumption that the mother is best suited to care for
young children" in making custody awards).
149. See In re K.A.W., 2 0km. Trib. 338 (Child. Ct. for the Comanche In-
dian Tribe 1992).
150. In re C.D.S., 1 Okla. Trib. 200, 204 (Ct. of Indian Offenses for the Del.
Tribe of W. Okla. 1988).
151. Davis v. Means, 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6125, 6126 (Navajo Sup. Ct. 1994)
(citations omitted).
152. In re J.J.S., 4 Navajo Rptr. 192, 195 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1983)
(distinguishing the Anglo view of parenthood from the Navajo common law
that children belong to more than just the parents, and recognizing that ex-
tended families and clans have an obligation to care for children whose par-
ents are unable to do so). In the area of adoptions, the willingness of tribal
judges to endorse a concept of "open adoption" with ongoing contacts between
the birth parents and the child has yielded a unique lesson in tribal justice.
The tribal court of the Mississippi Band of Choctaws approved of such an ar-
rangement after the Supreme Court remitted an adoption dispute to its exclu-
sive jurisdiction in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30 (1989). See Marcia Coyle, After the Gavel Comes Down, NAT'L L. J., Feb.
25, 1991, at 1; Rainey, supra note 84 (describing settlement in adoption feud
in which Anglo adoptive parents agreed to maintain ties between adopted
children and Pomo Indian tribe). Interestingly, Indian leaders have urged
Congress to amend the ICWA to include a provision authorizing state courts
to decree open adoptions in cases under the ICWA even where otherwise pro-
hibited by state law. See H.R. 1082, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 569, 105th Cong.
(1997); Indian Child Welfare Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. of In-
dian Affairs and the House Resources Comm. (June 18, 1997), available in
1997 WL 338648 (testimony of Deborah J. Doxtator, Chairwoman of the
Oneida Nation of Wisconsin) (stating that "[tihis provision would... mak[e]
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parenthood may be interpreted differently. For example, in a
recent case before the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Ap-
peals, the court was faced with assessing a child support award
against a Crow Creek father who had children from more than
one relationship. In such a situation, state law would have
given legal priority in terms of support to the offspring of the
man's first relationship, but the court was unwilling to assume
that the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe had a similar policy:
Ihe cultural differences between the non-Native American popula-
tion of the state of South Dakota and the Native American population
of the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe may be such that the proposition that
the "first born child has priority in regard to support" does not fit
within the acceptable cultural standards of the Crow Creek Sioux
Tribe. 153
Significantly, the court believed that its responsibility as a
tribal appellate court "require[d] it to consider the cultural dif-
ferences and societal norms of Indian tribes in rendering its
decision .... In particular, in regard to domestic relations and
the support of children, Crow Creek Sioux may have consid-
erably different standards. 154
In another dispute before a tribal court of one of the Paiute
tribes, a court used a standard combining the practices of tra-
ditional Northern Paiute medicine men and "conventional
white medical treatment" to determine whether a child had
been deprived of adequate medical care under tribal law.155 In
such cases the tribal judges themselves are articulating their
own obligation to discern and interpret the traditional law of
the tribe.
Tribal culture may directly impact a court's resolution of
disputes involving custody of children. A Cheyenne River
Sioux court, for instance, explained that the tribal court must
consider the cultural appropriateness of a proposed custody
placement. 156 In particular, the tribal forum should take into
adoption to non-Indian families more attractive to Tribes, because of the pos-
sibility that the child may be more likely to keep ties with his or her culture").
153. Attika v. Thompson, 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6001 (N. Plains Intertribal
Ct. App. 1993) (remanding to trial court for determination of tribal policy).
154. Id. at 6002. The court directed the Crow Creek Tribal Court on re-
mand to determine the applicable tribal cultural standard--either by the
tribal judge's own personal knowledge or, if necessary, from testimony of
tribal elders or other appropriate sources. See id.
155. In re T.M.M., 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6039 (Walker River Paiute Juv. Ct.
1996).




account "the appropriate familiarization of the child with
Lakota customs, traditions and practices and the reported
Lakota tradition of returning Lakota children placed with
members of the extended family for child rearing to their bio-
logical parent upon request."157 In a similar vein, a tribal ap-
peals court on the Flathead Reservation recently considered a
father's petition for the return of his son from the custody of
the child's maternal grandparents.158 Observing that Anglo-
American law generally recognizes that parents have rights
superior to those of the extended family, the court reasoned
that such a principle reflects a culture that is different from
that of the tribes:
In the culture of the Tribes, extended families play a much greater
role in raising children. The rights of such extended family members
will not necessarily be subordinate to natural parents when those ex-
tended family members have been rearing a child in their home or
when they can offer more continuity of care than a parent who has
not played a major role in parenting.15 9
The tribal judges, although situated within and heavily influ-
enced by the dominant society, are perpetuating the voice of
the tribes as they self-consciously illuminate tribal culture.
The family codes of many tribes explicitly embrace the
preservation of cultural heritage as a guiding principle in in-
terpretation of the formal law. The Children's Code of the
Cherokee Nation, for example, provides that it is to be con-
strued "[tlo protect the interest of the Cherokee Nation in pre-
serving and promoting the heritage, culture, tradition and val-
ues of the Cherokee Nation for its children."160 The Domestic
Relations Code of the Colorado River Tribes requires that it
shall be construed to "give full consideration to religious and
traditional preferences and practices of children during the
disposition of a matter."161 In the formal law of many tribes,
the substantive standards guiding a tribal court's resolution of
a child custody dispute include factors relating to tribal cul-
157. Id. at 6045 (reversing trial court's award of permanent custody of
child to non-parent).
158. See In re Application of L.F., 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6015 (Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation Ct. App. 1996).
159. Id. at 6016 (holding that because father had actual physical custody of
son before voluntarily placing him with grandparents, he was entitled to re-
turn of custody of child).
160. CHEROKEE NATION CHILDREN'S CODE § 1(E) (1993).




ture. One code provides that in determining custody the tribal
court shall consider the "tribal affiliation of the parties and the
child."162 Similarly, the Colville Tribal Code states that the
tribal court "shall determine custody in accordance with the
best interests of the child and, secondarily, the traditions and
customs of the Colville Indian people." 163 The Code also lists
the Indian heritage of the child as a relevant factor in a cus-
tody determination. The Lummi Indian Tribe requires its
tribal court, in determining child custody, to consider the
"tribal affiliation of the parties and the child" and the "extent
of the participation of the parties in tribal cultural activi-
ties."164 In yet another variation, the Yerington Paiute Tribe
has codified a restriction on removing a child from the reserva-
tion "unless there is no suitable person on the reservation to
act as custodian."' 65
A tribal court's consideration of culture and tradition in its
judicial decisionmaking may make state courts reluctant to re-
spect the tribal court's ruling where non-Indian interests are at
stake.166 Anglo-American judges, who can often misunderstand
the meaning of tribal identity, may fear that the foreign con-
cept of tribalism will override the best interests of the child.167
Especially where the parties feuding over child custody include
non-Indians, Anglo courts and non-Indian participants often
fear that pro-Indian bias will trump other factors and that
tribal courts will disregard testimony of emotional bonding or
other evidence favorable to the non-Indian party.168 Thus, a
162. CHEHALIS MARRIAGE CODE § 11.4.02(g) (1985).
163. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILE RESERVATION LAW & ORDER
CODE § 13.4.10 (1979).
164. LUMMI CODE OF LAWS § 11.4.02(g)-(h) (1974).
165. YERINGTONPAIu'E LAW & ORDER CODE § 9-70-050(h) (1977).
166. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 10, at 79-98 (analyzing the scope of
tribal judicial and legislative jurisdiction over non-Indians).
167. The history of the ICWA in the state courts is replete with examples
of refusals by the courts to yield to presumptive tribal jurisdiction. See gener-
ally Carriere, supra note 90.
168. A non-Indian litigant in a custody battle with her Choctaw in-laws
over her two young daughters recently objected to the tribe's jurisdiction,
stating, "Just because the girls would be more exposed to Choctaw heritage in
Oklahoma doesn't make the family there better guardians than their mother."
Todd Bensman, Tribal Court May Settle Custody Case, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 7, 1998, at 23A, available in 1998 WL 2503227. Such fears have
been fueled by media coverage of several adoption cases under the ICWA. For
a recent controversial California decision refusing to follow the literal terms of
the ICWA, see In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The
case generated widespread media attention. See, e.g., Rainey, supra note 84;
[Vol. 83:927966
IDENTITYAND ASSIMILATION
tribe's adherence to tribal cultural standards in its child cus-
tody determinations may pose a barrier to the recognition of
these judgments in state courts. Perhaps in an effort to avoid
this risk, a few tribes have adopted family codes that are de-
void of references to the relevance of tribal cultural heritage. 169
C. TRIBAL DEFINITIONS OF CHI= CUSTODY JURISDICTION
The codes of many tribes were not drafted to resolve juris-
dictional disputes with other sovereigns. Instead, they resem-
ble charters or authorizing documents to be used by the tribal
government to define the substantive and procedural rules to
follow in resolving disputes between members or between a
member and the tribe. In the domestic relations realm, the
tribal codes may be silent as to the jurisdictional basis for child
custody determinations, the unstated assumption being that
power to determine custody exists whenever the tribal court
has power to decree a divorce. Thus, the following overview of
tribal rules for child custody jurisdiction is, in part, an ex-
trapolation from the tribes' requirements for divorce jurisdic-
tion.170
1. Tribal Membership
In the child welfare context and the child custody context
alike, a tribe's jurisdiction under its own law generally turns in
part on the child's identity as "Indian."'7' Today most tribes
adhere to a relatively finite blood-quantum test to determine
membership eligibility in order to protect the tribe as an en-
tity.172 A few tribes, most markedly the Cherokee Nation of
Jane Gorman & Diane Michelsen, Challenge to Native.American Adoptions,
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997, at B5. See also Mississippi Band of Choctaw v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (nullifying state court ruling on the adoption of
Choctaw children because of the ICWA's mandate of exclusive tribal jurisdic-
tion over Indian children domiciled on reservation).
169. See infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
170. This "divorce equals custody" approach is found in the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Code and is explained in detail by the tribal court of ap-
peals in Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux
Ct. App. 1997), discussed infra at notes 217-33 and accompanying text.
171. Federal law, through the ICWA, defines Indian child to mean any
unmarried minor who is either a member of a federally recognized Indian
tribe or who is eligible for membership and is the biological child of a member
of a tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1994). The ICWA, however, does not govern
interparental custody disputes-the focus of this Article.
172. According to Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, two qualifica-
tions generally must be met in order for a person to be considered an Indian:
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Oklahoma, have taken a more inclusive approach that broad-
ens the tribal base.17 3 Thus, a tribe's own definition of mem-
bership is of critical importance in determining the scope of its
power over children.
The formal laws of many tribes give tribal courts the power
to decide child custody on the simple basis of the tribal enroll-
ment of at least one of the parents.174 Such laws are premised
on the traditional authority of an Indian tribe over the domes-
tic relations of its members and generally are drafted without
attention to the problem of jurisdictional conflict with other
sovereigns.17 5 The jurisdictional language varies from tribe to
some of the person's ancestors must have lived in pre-Columbian North
America, and the person must be recognized as an Indian by his or her tribe
or community. COHEN, supra note 11, at 19-20. Before the passage of the In-
dian Reorganization Act in 1934, most tribes did not keep formal membership
rolls, but when the United States government conditioned federal recognition
of Indian tribes on defined membership criteria, tribes developed such crite-
ria, often with the BIA's assistance. Many tribal provisions call for a mini-
mum of one-fourth degree of blood of the tribe in question but a few require as
much as one-half degree of tribal blood. See id. at 22-23.
173. See MARKS, supra note 16, at 378 (stating that survival of tribes in-
volves two opposing strategies-keeping blood-quantum high to protect tribal
identity or widening tribal base by accepting minimal blood connections).
174. Under the Ak-Chin Indian Community Code, for example, in divorce
actions "at least one of the parties must be a member of the Community and
reside on the reservation at the time of instituting the action," with no sepa-
rate jurisdictional rules for child custody. AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY CODE
§ 5.23 (1975). Adoption, on the other hand, requires that the child be a resi-
dent of the reservation. See id. § 5.24. In similar fashion, the Tribal Code of
the Confederated Tribes, Chehalis Reservation, provides that jurisdiction in
divorce cases exists if either party to the marriage is an enrolled member of
the Chehalis Indian Tribe. CHEHALIS MARRIAGE CODE § 11.2.03 (1985). In
custody matters, the same code provides that a custody proceeding can be
commenced by a parent in a divorce action or, alternatively, by the filing of a
petition for custody "where the child is permanently resident or on the reser-
vation where [hel is found or enrolled." Id. § 11.4.01(a)(1)(ii). Thus, member-
ship in the tribe or the child's residence on the reservation are two apparently
alternative jurisdictional bases for custody determinations. The Tribal Code
of the Lummi Indian Tribe is yet another example of jurisdiction resting on
tribal membership, providing that jurisdiction for divorce exists where one of
the parties to the marriage is either an enrolled member of the Tribe or a
resident of the Lummi Indian Reservation. LUhMI CODE OF LAWS § 11.2.03
(1974). The Code does not set out specific jurisdictional rules for custody.
175. At least one code did acknowledge the potential assertion of conflict-
ing jurisdiction by another tribe or a state. The laws of the Colorado River
Tribes provide, in an explanatory note regarding tribal court jurisdiction, that
anyone can file for divorce "regardiess of whether any party is Indian or not.
Usually the tribal court, however, will decline jurisdiction in cases in the in-
terests of comity if no Indian or Indian-owned property is involved."
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tribe, and several codes adhere to a jurisdictional framework
imposed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) that tribal civil
jurisdiction extends only to disputes where the defending party
is an Indian.1 76 It is not clear whether Indian tribes may con-
stitutionally assert civil jurisdiction over non-Indians for
claims arising on tribal lands, but recent pronouncements by
the Supreme Court clearly suggest that tribes possess such
authority.17 7 Thus, this BIA-imposed jurisdictional limitation
may not be constitutionally mandated. Moreover, the ordinary
requirement that a court possess personal jurisdiction over the
defendant would not serve as a barrier to tribal jurisdiction in
child custody cases since traditional notions of in personam ju-
DIVORCE OR LEGAL SEPARATION 57 (1995).
176. Under federal regulations setting forth the Bureau of Indian Affairs'
Code for Courts of Indian Offenses, jurisdiction exists over actions against In-
dian defendants but not over actions against non-Indians except by stipula-
tion of the parties. Civil Jurisdiction, Limitations of Actions, 25 C.F.R. §
11.103 (1998). Many tribal codes copied that model. See NATIONAL AMERICAN
INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FuTURE 47-48
(1978). Professor Pommersheim has criticized this jurisdictional framework
as "the handiwork of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and its commitment to act
cautiously with regard to jurisdiction involving non-Indians," and has noted
that such a policy is clearly at odds with the current trenid toward meaningful
self-determination. POMMERSHEIM, supra note 10, at 87.
177. In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981), the Court
explained that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe, i.e., powers
that exist apart from an explicit statute or treaty, do not extend to the activi-
ties of nonmembers. The Court noted, however, that even without congres-
sional authorization, tribal civil jurisdiction extends to nonmembers who en-
ter consensual relations with members or whose conduct on fee lands within
the reservation directly affects tribal interests. See id. at 566. Later, the Su-
preme Court stated that "[tiribal authority over the activities of non-Indians
on reservations lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty," and that
"[clivil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts
unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute."
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987). The position expressed
in Iowa Mutual has led Judge Canby to observe that "[ilt seems likely... that
most tribal courts will be able to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians for
reservation-based claims." WILLIAM C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 159 (1988). Most recently, in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S.
438 (1997), the Court applied Montana to hold that a tribe could not assert
jurisdiction over a nonmember defendant in a tort suit arising on a state
highway within the reservation's boundaries. For an analysis of this topic, see
Frickey, supra note 37, at 1768-77 (arguing that the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of the question shows shifting emphases on consent, geographic pres-
ence, and tribal interests); L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sov-
ereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 854 (1996) (arguing that
the question of civil jurisdiction over nonmembers should be reconceived pri-
marily as paradigm of consent).
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risdiction do not apply in custody litigation.17 8 In practice,
many tribal courts have readily asserted jurisdiction in domes-
tic relations actions brought by members against nonmem-
bers,179 but the older limitations do persist in some tribal codes
despite the arguable lack of a constitutional justification for
such a limit. In these tribal codes, if only one divorcing party
is an enrolled member, that person must be the responding or
defending party, not the petitioner.180 The Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, for example, has authorized its tribal courts to hear di-
vorce petitions and resolve the custody of minor children when
both parties are "Indians" or where the petitioner is a non-
Indian and the respondent is an Indian. On the other hand, if
the petitioner is an Indian and respondent a non-Indian, then
according to the tribal code, jurisdiction exists only if the non-
Indian respondent voluntarily submits to the tribal court's ju-
risdiction.181
These membership-based tribal codes are premised on the
traditional assumption that the sovereign power of the tribe
includes the resolution of family disputes involving tribal
members. The prevailing Anglo-American model, as repre-
sented by the UCCJA, the new UCCJEA, and the federal
PKPA, gives no weight to this pivotal jurisdictional fact. In-
stead, the Anglo-American model now focuses on the primary
178. In the "tri-polar" context of child custody, Anglo-American courts for
the most part have been willing to dispense with traditional requirements of
personal jurisdiction. I have explored the role of personal jurisdiction in child
custody litigation elsewhere. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Child Custody Juris-
diction and Territoriality, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 369 (1991).
179. The Eberhard case, discussed infra at notes 217-33 and accompanying
text, is a very recent example of a tribe's exercise of jurisdiction in an action
against a nonmember. See also In re Marriage of Skillen, 956 P.2d 1 (Mont.
1998), discussed infra at notes 234-43 and accompanying text (recognizing ju-
risdiction of Indian tribe to resolve child custody dispute between member and
nonmember).
180. Two codes contained only a general limitation on the civil jurisdiction
of the tribal courts, without a separate provision for jurisdiction in domestic
relations cases. See HOPI TRIBAL CODE § 1.7.1 (1972) (recognizing civil juris-
diction of tribal courts in cases where defendants are members of the Tribe);
CODE OF ORDINANCES OF THE SALT RIVER PIMA-MARICOPA INDIAN COM-
MUNITY § 4.1(d) (1981) (recognizing civil jurisdiction of tribal courts in cases
where defendant is a member of the community). But see HOPI TRIBAL CODE
§ 1.7.1A (seeming to extend civil jurisdiction to cases where defendant enters
upon the Hopi Reservation, by a theory of constructive consent).
181. JICARILLA APACHE TRIBAL CODE tit. 3, ch. 2 (1987). The Code con-




concept of a child's "home state."182 Thus, a tribal child custody
decree that was premised on the membership of one of the par-
ents, without more, would not be recognized and enforced un-
der the express terms of either the Uniform Acts or the federal
act. Moreover, some state courts refuse even to accept a tribe's
definition of its own membership.
A Louisiana court opinion is illustrative. In Barbry v.
Dauzat,183 the state court rejected an Indian father's argu-
ments for the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court in a cus-
tody dispute between the father and the child's non-Indian
mother.184 Both the father and the child were enrolled mem-
bers of the Tunica-Biloxi Indian Tribe and residing on the Res-
ervation, and the Tunica-Biloxi tribal court had issued a cus-
tody decision favorable to the father.185 A Louisiana state
court, however, had also exercised jurisdiction over the dispute
and had awarded custody to the mother. 186 In upholding the
state court's authority, the court of appeals pointedly observed
that in many cases of jurisdictional conflict between states and
tribes, the tribal courts have evidenced "a tribal court concern
for tribal sovereignty, cultural survival, and the welfare of the
Indian child."187 Such concerns were of no moment to the state
tribunal. Indeed, the court refused to defer to the tribe even as
to the child's status as an Indian. Observing that the child was
"one-quarter Tunica-Biloxi Indian and three-quarter Cauca-
sian by ancestry," the court went on to invoke a matrilineal
definition of membership without any mention of the tribe's
own membership criteria.188 Instead, the court applied princi-
ples of the civil law (with citations to Justinian) to determine
that the child was not an Indian: "[W]e find that a child born of
a Caucasian woman by an Indian father would be considered a
child of the Caucasian race as the condition of the mother, and
not the quantum of the Indian ancestry of the child, deter-
mines the condition of the offspring."'189 In an ironic twist, the
182. See supra notes 94-111 and accompanying text (discussing UCCJA's
recognition of home state jurisdiction and the later prioritization of the home
state jurisdictional basis in the PKPA and the new UCCJEA).
183. 576 So. 2d 1013 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
184. The father in Barbry moved to dismiss or, alternatively, to transfer a
pending custody action in state court to the tribe. Id. at 1014.
185. See id. at 1021.
186. See id. at 1013.
187. Id. at 1021.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1021-22.
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court emphasized that "[p]ersons of more white than Indian
blood have been held to be white under the laws of other
states."190 The Barbry case reveals a disdain for the concept of
tribal sovereignty, a disdain seemingly fueled by the court's
discomfort with the prospect of tribal power over the welfare of
the "Caucasian" child.
2. Geographic Ties to the Reservation
Several tribal codes include a geographic tie to the reser-
vation by a parent or child as a prerequisite to the exercise of
custody jurisdiction. The required territorial connection often
takes the form of residence or domicile on reservation lands.
The Chippewa-Cree Tribe, for example, provides that tribal
courts shall have jurisdiction in child custody matters "if the
child is domiciled or resides within the Court's jurisdiction or if
it is in the best interest of the child that the Tribal Court as-
sume jurisdiction. 191 Other tribes have explicitly endorsed the
jurisdictional standard of the federal ICWA. The Cherokee
Code gives tribal courts jurisdiction in domestic relations "of
Indians, as provided by the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act
including child custody and adoption matters. Residence re-
quirements shall be as provided in the Indian Child Welfare
Act."192 Similarly, the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa has incor-
porated the ICWA definition of child custody proceedings and
gives exclusive jurisdiction to the tribal court "if the minor is
domiciled or resides on lands under the jurisdiction of the
Band."'193 Finally, several tribes have not established separate
190. Id. at 1022. The irony arises from the history in the South of overtly
racist statutory categories of blood-quantum evidence to preserve the purity of
the white race. See generally Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's
Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189
(1966).
191. LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE CHIPPEWA-CREE TRIBE OF THE ROCKY
BOY'S RESERVATION tit. 5, § 3.8 (1987). For general divorce jurisdiction, the
code requires that at least one of the parties "has lived within or has been
domiciled within the Court's jurisdiction for the preceding ninety (90) days, or
has significant connections with the Chippewa-Cree Tribe." Id. § 3.1.
192. CHEROKEE NATION CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 24(c) (West 1993). The
Cherokee Children's Code, moreover, provides that it shall apply "to children
subject to the jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation who reside on 'Indian Coun-
try' as defined by federal and Cherokee Nation law." Id. tit. 10, § 1.2.
193. MILLE LACS BAND STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 5(a), 4(b)(7) (substituting the
word "territories" for "lands") (West 1996); see also LAW & ORDER CODE OF
THE CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE § 8-3-2 (1980) (requiring in divorce action
that plaintiff be a resident of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation,
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rules for jurisdiction in domestic relations matters and appar-
ently rely on provisions for general civil jurisdiction over per-
sons or events within the territory of the reservation.
19 4
As would be expected, the geographic connections that suf-
fice for the exercise of jurisdiction differ among tribes, and
most tribal codes do not conform to the formulaic approach to
jurisdiction of the UCCJA and the UCCJEA. The concepts of
"domicile" and "residence" frequently appear in the tribal codes
but not in the Uniform Acts, in part because the Commission-
ers preferred to avoid terms of unclear meaning or application.
Instead, the Commissioners created the more objective concept
of "home state" jurisdiction-where a child and one contestant
have lived for six consecutive months-to have a "definite and
certain test,"'95 and in the newly-promulgated Act they have
prioritized this basis of jurisdiction. Although a given fact pat-
tern could satisfy both a tribe's standards and the standards of
the Uniform Acts, a tribe complying with its own jurisdictional
code could easily run afoul of the model of the new Uniform
Act. The Chippewa-Cree Tribe, for example, could assert ju-
risdiction to determine the custody of a child it found to be
domiciled within the reservation, even though the child might
have been living off the reservation for more than six months.
A state applying the new UCCJEA, even if it had adopted the
section mandating respect for tribal court decisions, would not
recognize initial tribal jurisdiction in such a case. Thus, under
the acts, the goal of objectivity and certainty would trump the
tribe's more subjective link to the dispute.
3. Tribal Adoption of the Uniform Acts
In a few tribes, the process of assimilation is evident in the
formal laws governing child custody jurisdiction. In these
with no separate jurisdictional requirements for custody).
194. See, e.g., LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE OF
INDIANS § 1-3.01 (1985) (authorizing jurisdiction over all persons who volun-
tarily come onto or live within exterior boundaries of Coeur d'Alene Indian
Reservation); HOH INDIAN TRIBE COURT PROCEDURES ORDINANCE § 5(c) (1986)
(authorizing "civil jurisdiction over all persons who enter the exterior bounda-
ries of the Hoh Reservation for whatever purpose, said act of entry being con-
strued as consent of such jurisdiction"); CODE OF ORDINANCES OF THE SALT
RIVER PIMA-MARICOPA INDIAN COMMUNITY § 4.1(d) (1981) (authorizing civil
jurisdiction if defendant "is domiciled or residing within the community; or
has caused an event to occur within the community out of which the claim...
arose").




tribes, the family codes have been drafted to reflect the pre-
vailing jurisdictional model that is established by the UCCJA.
The Northern Cheyenne Tribe, for example, has a detailed
family code that provides jurisdictional categories substan-
tially similar to the UCCJA's categories of home state, signifi-
cant connection, and emergency jurisdiction.196 Similarly, sev-
eral Arizona tribes have incorporated Arizona's version of the
UCCJA in their tribal codes. 197 In tribes such as these, the
promise of inter-system legitimacy has led the tribal councils to
model their child custody jurisdictional criteria after the Anglo-
American norm. The goal of achieving recognition of custody
decrees outside the boundaries of the reservation is clearly one
of the forces driving the inclusion of such jurisdictional stan-
dards in the tribal codes. The Northern Cheyenne Tribal Code,
for instance, reveals the Tribe's acute interest in having its
own decrees respected: it mandates recognition of decrees of
other courts that rest on similar jurisdictional bases except
when the other tribal or state court has refused to recognize
decrees of the Northern Cheyenne Court.198
In Arizona, the unusual phenomenon of several tribes'
willingness to adopt the UCCJA is perhaps a function of Ari-
zona's peculiar version of the Uniform Act. Unlike all other
states, Arizona has included "domicile of the child" as an alter-
native to "home state" jurisdiction, 199 and the tribes that have
196. See TRIBAL CODE OF NORTHERN CHEYENNE § 8-3-1 (1987).
197. See LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE FORT MOJAVE INDIAN TRIBE § 476
(1981) (adopting Arizona's version of UCCJA); HUALAPAI TRIBE CIVIL &
CRIMINAL LAW & ORDER CODE § 3.21 (1975) (adopting Arizona's version of
UCCJA); JUVENILE CODE OF PASCUA YAQUT TRIBE § 10.17 (1992) (same);
YAvAPAI-PREscOTr TRIBE LAW & ORDER CODE § 3.21 (1979) (same). One
other Arizona-based tribe has followed the UCCJA model but provided some-
what greater flexibility. See LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE HAVASUPAI INDIAN
TRIBE § 3.23 (1978) (providing for child custody jurisdiction in terms that are
similar to, but more flexible than, provisions of the UCCJA- where child and
contestant are living in community; where child lived in community in past
six months but is absent and a parent or like contestant lives in community;
where at least one contestant and child have a significant connection with
community; where a child while present is abandoned or in emergency situa-
tion; where another court has deferred to Havasupai Tribal Court).
198. See TRIBAL CODE OF NORTHERN CHEYENNE § 8-4-11.
199. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-433(A)(1) (West Supp. 1997-98)
(authorizing jurisdiction where "[t]his state is the domicile or the home state
of the child"). The inclusion of domicile as the basis for child custody jurisdic-
tion is contrary to the terms of the UCCJA and has prompted at least one
court to disregard a custody decree from Arizona that was based on domicile.
See O'Neal v. O'Neal, 329 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Iowa 1983).
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incorporated the UCCJA into their codes have carried over that
unusual feature.200 Thus, the tribes were able to adopt Ari-
zona's version of the UCCJA without relinquishing the tradi-
tional jurisdictional basis of domicile in their tribal codes. An-
other factor that may continue to influence tribes in Arizona is
the decision in Martinez v. Superior Court,20 where the Ari-
zona Court of Appeals held that the UCCJA should be con-
strued to apply to Indian tribes-the only reported decision
from a state court to so hold. Since Martinez places tribes on
notice that the UCCJA will be applied to them in Arizona state
courts, the tribes have an ongoing incentive to incorporate the
jurisdictional standards of the Uniform Act in their tribal
codes.
D. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JuRISDIcTIoNAL RULES AND
SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS
My examination of tribal codes revealed an unexpected
facet of a tribe's decision to adopt jurisdictional requirements
that resemble those of the UCCJA. In those tribes that have
enacted the UCCJA framework for custody actions, the sub-
stantive standards for resolving custody disputes likewise re-
veal the force of assimilation. Among the tribal codes that
have incorporated the model of the Uniform Act, none has sub-
stantive provisions that contain any reference to the preserva-
tion of a child's cultural identity or tribal affiliation as factors
to be taken into account by the tribal decisionmaker. In fram-
ing their jurisdictional laws to parallel the standards of the
UCCJA, the tribes performed a clean sweep, eliminating refer-
ences to a child's connection to the tribe. Thus, the tribal codes
of the Northern Cheyenne, 202 Havasupai, 203 and Hualapai20 4
200. The Yavapai Prescott Indian Tribe, for example, has authorized its
tribal court to make an initial child custody determination where the
"community is the domicile of the child at the time of commencement of the
proceeding, or had been the child's domicile within six (6) months before
commencement of the proceeding... and a parent or person acting as parent
continues to live in this community." YAVAPAI PRESCOTT TRIBE LAW & ORDER
CODE § 3.21 (1979).
201. 731 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
202. TRIBAL CODE OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE § 8-3-2 (1987) (directing
court to determine custody "in accordance with the best interest of the child"
by reference to wishes of parents and child, relationship of child with parents
and others, child's adjustment to home, school and community, mental and
physical health of all individuals, and whether child has been incorporated
into home of parent).
203. LAw & ORDER CODE OF THE HAVASUPAI INDIAN TRIBE § 3.24 (1978)
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tribes employ culture-neutral language to guide tribal courts in
resolving custody disputes, and phrases authorizing tribal
courts to consider the preservation of the child's Indian heri-
tage are noticeably absent. This cultural neutrality stands in
sharp contrast to the substantive codes of tribes that have not
adopted the UCCJA jurisdictional model. 205 In these codes,
whether based on geographic or membership standards, the
substantive custody guidelines often give weight to a parent's
tribal affiliation and to a parent's ability to maintain the
child's cultural ties with his or her tribe.206 Although tribal
courts may give weight to cultural facts even without express
authority to do so, the silence of the codes that have adopted a
UCCJA-style jurisdictional framework is telling. It suggests
that, at least as a matter of formal codified law, the unique
contributions of the tribal forum-its capacity to discern and
perpetuate tribal culture-may be eclipsed by the tribe's desire
to achieve legitimacy in the dominant society.
Several years ago I saw firsthand the benefits of a tribe's
reliance on Anglo-American jurisdictional and substantive
rules in the child custody arena. Only after the fact did I con-
sider the costs associated with the tribe's conformity to Anglo-
American standards. The experience arose out of my represen-
tation of Carol Redcherries, a member of the Northern Chey-
enne Tribe and former tribal judge. Carol helped me under-
stand a small part of Northern Cheyenne life, and I, in turn,
helped her maintain custody of her granddaughter Lupe.
(directing court to award custody "in accordance with the best interests of the
child" after considering parties' and children's wishes, child's interrelationship
with family members and others, child's adjustment to home, school and
community, physical and mental health of all individuals, and age of child).
204. HUALAPAI TRIBE CIVIL & CRuIMNAL LAW & ORDER CODE § 3.22 (1975)
(directing court to determine custody in accordance "with the best interests of
the child," considering wishes of child and parents, interrelationship of child
with parents, siblings and other persons who may significantly affect child's
interest, child's adjustment to home, school and community, and mental and
physical health of all individuals).
205. See supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., LUMMI CODE OF LAWS § 11.2.03 (1974) (imposing jurisdic-
tional requirement in divorce that either petitioner or respondent be an en-
rolled member of Lummi Indian Tribe or a resident of Lummi Indian Reserva-
tion); id. § 11.4.01 (providing alternative jurisdictional basis for custody action
where child is "permanently resident or on the Reservation where he is found
or enrolled"); id. § 11.4.02 (providing that court shall consider, inter alia,
"tribal affiliation of the parties and the child and the extent of the participa-
tion of the parties in tribal cultural activities").
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Carol's own daughter, also a member of the Northern
Cheyenne tribe, had died from cancer while still a young
woman. After her death, a tug-of-war ensued between Carol
and Lupe's biological father, Ruben Alegria, a Mexican-
American man with no affiliation to Carol's tribe. Immediately
following the death of Carol's daughter, the tribal court had
awarded temporary custody of Lupe to Alegria but set a date
for a hearing on permanent custody. To protect its jurisdiction,
the court prohibited the father from removing Lupe from the
Northern Cheyenne Reservation. Nevertheless, after attend-
ing his wife's funeral, Alegria left the reservation to return to
his residence in Tucson, Arizona, taking little Lupe with
him.207 Unknown to Alegria, the applicable family code of the
Northern Cheyenne tribe created a presumption favoring bio-
logical parents over non-parents in custody disputes, without
regard to the parent's Indian heritage. 208 By disobeying the
tribal court's edict, however, Alegria showed his contempt for
tribal authority and lost the benefit of the presumption. Pro-
ceeding in the father's absence, the tribal court ruled that
Carol should have permanent custody of the child.2
09
When I encountered Carol, she was armed with a copy of
the tribal court decree and was trying to persuade local Ari-
zona authorities to help her enforce her right to custody. We
often spoke about the role of the extended family among the
Northern Cheyenne people. "Lupe has many grandmothers,"
Carol once said. I smiled at her, thinking that she was refer-
ring to the spirits of ancestors. She explained her meaning.
"In our tribe, all my sisters are viewed as 'grandmother' to
Lupe. The word is the same. We are all responsible for the
raising of the grandchildren." I began to understand that
within the Northern Cheyenne community, Lupe would be at
the center of a network of care and familial support.210
207. The facts of the case are set out at Alegria v. Redcherries, 812 P.2d
1085, 1086 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
208. Several provisions of the Northern Cheyenne family code favor bio-
logical parents. See, e.g., TRIBAL CODE OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE § 8-3-
I(C) (1987) (providing that a nonparent may seek custody only if the child is
not in the physical custody of a parent); id. § 8-3-2(A) (listing the wishes of the
child's parents as a relevant factor in determining custody); id. § 8-3-7
(granting a non-custodial parent presumptive visitation rights).
209. See Order of Jan. 11, 1990, In re Lupe Moriah Alegria, No. 89-233
(Northern Cheyenne Tribal Ct.).
210. Although my pro bono representation of Carol focused on the jurisdic-
tional and judgment-recognition aspects of the case, I developed a firm convic-
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After a loss in the state trial court,211 Carol's effort to en-
force the tribal decree in Arizona ultimately succeeded. In
taking her case to the state appellate courts, I advanced my
client's interest in the best way I knew possible. I called the
court's attention to the fact that the jurisdictional standards of
the Northern Cheyenne Tribe were modeled after the familiar
framework of the UCCJA.212 I made clear that the substantive
standards of the Northern Cheyenne Code on child custody fo-
cused on the best interests of the child in neutral language. I
argued that the tribal forum was competent to determine the
custody of little Lupe because the grandmother's Indian iden-
tity would not automatically trump the father's presumptive
rights under tribal law. In other words, I urged the court in
sterile logic to enforce the tribal decree because the tribal fo-
rum had acted on the basis of well-known jurisdictional and
substantive standards. In effect, I urged the state court to re-
spect the tribal court for its sameness, not its difference. The
strategy was successful. According to the court of appeals, the
decree of the Northern Cheyenne tribal court was entitled to
recognition under the doctrines of res judicata and comity and
under the statutory commands of state and federal law.213
With the benefit of reflection, I am now less comfortable
with my advocacy in Carol's case. Arguments for recognition of
tribal acts that are based on sameness inevitably promote as-
similation as an ideal.214 The decisionmaking of tribal courts,
tion that the best interests of Lupe would be served by her remaining with
Carol. Through Carol, the girl would experience a childhood among a small
and cohesive community where "Redcherries" is a respected tribal name. She
would grow up in a rural setting without material luxuries but surrounded by
the breathtaking grandeur of Montana. Her grandmother, an admired female
figure in the tribe, would serve as a positive role model for the young child. In
contrast, my impression was that Lupe's father would be unable to provide
the child with a stable home. I had no confidence, however, that the state
court would share my view of the merits of the custody dispute.
211. The state trial judge was clearly suspicious of the quality of justice
available to Alegria in the tribe's judicial system, but his final order rested on
a point ofjurisdiction. According to the judge's minute entry, Alegria and the
child had insufficient contact with the reservation to justify tribal court
authority, and the tribal decree was therefore "void for lack of jurisdiction."
Judgment, Alegria v. Redcherries, No. 268523 (Pima Co. Super. Ct. 1990).
212. See supra notes 196, 202 and accompanying text (describing provi-
sions of the Northern Cheyenne code).
213. See Alegria v. Redcherries, 812 P.2d at 1087.
214. As forcefully stated by Professor Pommersheim, "[tiribal courts do not
exist solely to reproduce or replicate the dominant canon appearing in state
and federal courts. If they did, the process of colonization would be complete
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however, is worthy of respect at least in part because of the
very difference that the tribal perspective offers. Although I
would not alter my successful representation of Carol's inter-
ests, I am troubled by the fact that her legal position was made
stronger because of the culture-neutral face of her tribe's code.
The tribes that have chosen to omit culture-specific standards
from their child custody laws have foregone an opportunity to
instruct state judges as well as their own judges about the im-
portance of cultural heritage in determining the placement of
Indian children.215 In contrast to the written code of the
Northern Cheyenne Tribe, most tribal codes include cultural or
spiritual facets of the child's well-being in addition to or in lieu
of the factors considered by the Anglo-American courts.216 For
such tribes, the legitimacy of their custody decrees should not
diminish in the eyes of state court judges merely because the
codes identify tribal affiliation and tribal culture as relevant
concerns.
IV. STATUTORY MANDATE VS. COMITY-TWO CASES
AND SOME ILLUSTRATIONS
A. EBERHARD V. EBERHARD: AN INTRA-TRIBAL DEBATE ON THE
PKPA
A provocative exploration of tribal sovereignty, full faith
and credit, and child custody jurisdiction can be found in an
opinion of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court of Appeals.
In Eberhard v. Eberhard,217 the court confronted a jurisdic-
tional conflict between the tribal trial court and a California
state court in a child custody battle. Although the tribal court
was addressing the applicability of the federal PKPA to Indian
tribes, the considerations involved in the PKPA analysis impli-
cate the same concerns that arise under the Commissioners'
new Uniform Act. The feuding parties in Eberhard were the
father, a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and the
and the unique legal cultures of the tribes fully extirpated." POMMERSHEIM,
supra note 10, at 99.
215. Christine Zuni has made this point forcefully: "To the extent that
tribal justice systems pattern themselves, not only in structure but in the law
applied in their systems, after federal and state court systems, they surrender
their own unique concepts of native law and participate, at a certain level, in
their own ethnocide." Zuni, supra note 17, at 24.
216. See supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
217. 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1997).
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non-Indian mother, and at the center of their fight was their
daughter, also an enrolled member of the tribe.218 The dispute
began when the father, alleging neglect against the mother,
filed a divorce action and an "emergency" custody petition in
tribal court in South Dakota at a time when his estranged wife
and daughter were living in California. After the tribal trial
court entered an emergency order transferring custody to the
father, the mother reluctantly complied with the order, turning
the child over to the father. One month after the tribal pro-
ceedings had begun, however, the mother filed her own divorce
action in a California court, seeking custody of her daughter.
Finding that it had jurisdiction in the matter, the California
trial court ordered that the minor child be returned to the cus-
tody of the mother. Armed with the favorable state court rul-
ing, the mother appeared specially in tribal court in South Da-
kota to enforce the California decree and to challenge the
tribe's jurisdiction over her. The tribal trial court agreed with
the mother's argument, concluding that the PKPA required
deference to the California forum, and ordered the release of
the child from the father's custody.
Much of the opinion of the tribal court of appeals focuses
on whether an Indian tribe is a "state" within the meaning of
the PKPA. Significantly, the tribe briefed the question at the
court's request and took the position that the federal statute
did not extend to Indian tribes.219 The tribe argued, in part,
that the application of the PKPA to Indian tribes was not
clearly intended by Congress and would be a significant cur-
tailment of tribal sovereignty.22 0 The tribal appeals court, how-
ever, disagreed. After reviewing the language of the Act and
its ambiguous legislative history, the court concluded that
"Congress intended the PKPA to apply to tribal courts as a
means of integrating them, and other courts, into the coopera-
tive federalism framework of the national union."2 1 The court
went on to address the tribe's sovereignty argument:
EThis court believes that this conclusion does not diminish tribal sov-
ereignty, as suggested by the tribe, but, rather, protects tribal sover-
eignty and the right of self-government of the Lakota people in many
instances. Furthermore, when the PKPA is read together with the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, adopted by many states...
218. See id. at 6059 (setting forth the facts of the case).
219. See id. at 6060.
220. See id.
221. Id. at 6064.
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but not by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe or most other tribes, it is
clear that most tribal judgments affecting the custody of tribal chil-
dren in divorce.., will not be adequately enforced or recognized by
the courts of other states, tribes, territories, and possessions without
a ruling that the PKPA applies to tribal courts and their orders.m
After concluding that the PKPA's reference to "state" includes
Indian tribes, the court went on to apply the statute to the case
before it. In so doing, the court reexamined the jurisdiction of
the California court. Because the mother's California court pe-
tition was filed when the father's custody action was already
pending in the tribal court, the Cheyenne River Sioux court of
appeals held that California lacked power under California law
to proceed with the case.2 The appeals court thus accom-
plished what it viewed as a victory for the role of tribes in the
federal system while at the same time protecting the rights of
the Indian father.
The Eberhard court's ruling that the PKPA applies to
tribes rested more on policy than on a strict reading of congres-
sional intent. Interestingly, the author of the opinion was Rob-
ert Clinton, a non-Indian law professor who has served as as-
sociate justice on the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Appellate
Court since 1992.224 In an earlier scholarly work, Clinton ar-
gued that the PKPA should be construed to apply to Indian
tribes,22 .5 and he took the opportunity to advance that view for
the court in Eberhard. Indeed, the debate between the tribal
court of appeals and the tribe itself about the impact of the
holding on tribal sovereignty parallels the debate in the schol-
arly literature about extending the national full faith and
credit mandate to tribes.22 6 The court, per Clinton, took issue
with the tribe's perspective on what would better serve its own
sovereign interests. "he PKPA," Clinton insisted, "is not in-
tended to and does not diminish the sovereignty of the court to
which it applies. Rather, it protects their jurisdiction by as-
suring that other sovereigns will not 'second guess' child cus-
tody orders granted full faith and credit under the Act."227 He
expanded on this point at some length, explaining that al-
222. Id.
223. See id. at 6067.
224. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, THE AALS DIRECTORY
OF LAw TEACHERS 1997-98, at 342-43 (1997).
225. See Roundtable, supra note 53, at 270.
226. See, e.g., Deloria & Laurence, supra note 53, at 378-79; Clinton, supra
note 69, at 897; Roundtable, supra note 53.
227. Eberhard, 24 Indian L. Rptr. at 6066.
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though a tribe's obligation to enforce a foreign custody decree
may in some theoretical sense lessen the tribe's sovereignty,
"that obligation can only be imposed on a government. It is
merely part of the glue that integrates the various sovereign
components of the federal union into a coherent nation."2 28 In
his sanguine reading of the PKPA's application to tribes, how-
ever, Clinton did not dwell on the jurisdictional requirements
embodied in the statute. lis dismissal of the tribe's objections
as merely "theoretical" shows that he did not grapple with the
concrete implications of the PKPA's jurisdictional rules for In-
dian tribes.
In my view, the fears of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
about the inroad on tribal sovereignty were well-founded. 229
The PKPA's mandate of full faith and credit to other sover-
eigns' decrees applies only as to decrees that are consistent
with the jurisdictional standards of the PKPA itself. Unless
state courts blink at the jurisdictional standards of the Act-
standards that differ significantly from the jurisdictional rules
often appearing in tribal codes-the PKPA will not lead to
widespread recognition of tribal custody decrees. Indian tribes
would have to engage in wholesale revamping of their jurisdic-
tional statutes in order for the PKPA to endow their custody
decrees with extra-territorial recognition. Instead, it will pro-
vide state courts with a statutory basis for disregarding tribal
judgments when the judgments rest on a jurisdictional founda-
tion that is unfamiliar.
In Eberhard itself, Clinton's opinion sustained the tribal
court's exercise of jurisdiction on a basis that is foreign to the
jurisdictional framework of the PKPA. Candidly creating a
definition of domicile designed to maximize tribal jurisdiction,
Clinton's opinion found that the child was domiciled on the
Cheyenne River Sioux reservation and therefore subject to the
tribal court's authority2 30 Both the reliance on the child's
228. Id.
229. Professor Robert Laurence has recently published an article criticiz-
ing the Eberhard case for somewhat different reasons than my own. See Rob-
ert Laurence, Full Faith and Credit in Tribal Courts: An Essay on Tribal Sov-
ereignty, Cross-Boundary Reciprocity and the Unlikely Case of Eberhard v.
Eberhard, 28 N.M. L. REV. 19 (1998) (disputing Eberhard's interpretation of
the PKPA and objecting to the abstract ideal of uniformity).
230. The tribal court of appeals reached that conclusion by exploring the
question of a child's domicile where the parents are separated. Instead of
viewing the domicile as following that of the custodial parent, the court an-
nounced the rule that the child should be deemed to have the domicile of any
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domicile-a concept not used in the PKPA or the UCCJA-and
the pro-tribal nature of the definition of domicile make it un-
likely that a state court would defer to the tribe's jurisdiction if
it stayed true to the mandate of the UCCJAPKPA.231
Concededly, the principles of neutrality and equality in-
herent in liberalism are advanced by the Eberhard opinion and
by the proposed extension of the new UCCJEA to tribes and
states alike. Equal treatment, however, does not respect the
unique status of Indian tribes.232 If applied uniformly to In-
dian tribes, the PKPA and the UCCJEA would subordinate a
tribe's concept of its own authority to the Anglo-American
model of child custody jurisdiction. The extension to Indian
tribes of the federal statute, as in Eberhard, and of the new
uniform state law would have a significant impact on tribal law
by encouraging tribes to alter their tribal codes and to abandon
their traditional bases of jurisdiction. Under the framework of
the PKPA as construed in Eberhard and under section 104 of
the new UCCJEA, recognition of tribal custody decrees de-
pends on their compatibility with uniform statutory standards
that do not on their face give weight to an Indian child's intan-
gible links to the tribe or the reservation.2 33
parent who is a member of the tribe. See Eberhard, 24 Indian L. Rptr. at 6061.
The court frankly acknowledged that such a rule has the benefit of "asserting
potential tribal court jurisdiction over any children who are enrolled in the
tribe or may be eligible for tribal membership by virtue of their parentage."
Id.
231. When a state diverges from the UCCJA in its jurisdictional provi-
sions, it runs the risk that other states will refuse to recognize its custody de-
crees. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
232. Cf. Tsosie, Pluralism, supra note 42, at 364 (stating that "Indian
tribes' unique political status justifies federal legislation granting them spe-
cial rights and forms an exception to prevailing liberal values favoring racial
equality").
233. Among other changes, the new Act prioritizes "home state" jurisdic-
tion. In other words, initial custody determinations based on the more flexi-
ble "significant connection[s]" of the child and one parent with the state are
not entitled to full faith and credit unless there is no home state-a state
where the child and one parent have lived for at least six consecutive months.
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 201(a)(2)(A), 9
U.L.A. 250 (Supp. 1998). As applied to Indian tribes, the prioritization of
home state jurisdiction would strip a tribal court of authority to render a cus-
tody decree if the child and one parent had lived off-reservation for six or
more months, notwithstanding tribal membership and geographic ties. See
supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
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B. INRE MARRIAGE OF SKTLLEN: A BoLD CorTY TOWARDS
TRIBAL CUSTODY DECREES
The Montana Supreme Court also recently addressed the
jurisdictional ambiguities inherent in a child custody dispute
between an Indian and non-Indian parent in In re Marriage of
Skillen.234 The court relied on the policies, although not the
letter, of the ICWA, the PKPA, and the UCCJA in fashioning a
unique doctrine to resolve jurisdictional competition between
state and tribal courts. In this case, both the mother and the
child were enrolled members of the Fort Peck Tribes in Mon-
tana and had significant contacts on and off the Reservation;
the father was a non-Indian and resided off the reservation. In
the course of the custody litigation, the father had obtained a
decree from the Montana state court awarding primary physi-
cal custody of the child to him, and the mother had secured a
later order from the tribal court awarding her temporary cus-
tody.235
In the face of this imbroglio, the Montana Supreme Court
took the opportunity to announce general guidelines for re-
solving such jurisdictional contests. Among its stated concerns
was the risk that a state's exercise of power in custody disputes
involving Indian children can bring about a corresponding de-
cline in tribal authority.236 The court gave paramount impor-
tance to the federal Indian law principle that exclusive tribal
jurisdiction exists where necessary to protect the tribe's politi-
cal integrity and welfare, including the tribe's right to exercise
authority over members within tribal boundaries. 237 While the
Skillen court acknowledged that the dispute before it involved
the interests of a nonmember as well as members, it reasoned
234. 956 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1998).
235. See id. at 4-5.
236. As the court stated:
We decline here to undermine the tribe's position as a sovereign en-
tity with the suggestion that merely because a resident Indian child
also has significant off-reservation contacts through his non-Indian
parent, its authority to exercise jurisdiction in domestic matters over
its members who reside on Indian land is put in jeopardy.
Id. at 16.
237. Id. at 6-7. The court relied on the non-infringement test of Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (finding that absent governing acts of Con-
gress, the question governing validity of state jurisdiction is "whether the
state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them"), and its later interpretations in Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981);
and Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S 438 (1997).
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that tribal sovereignty had to include a tribe's "right, within its
own boundaries and membership, to provide for the care and
upbringing of its young, a sine qua non to the preservation of
its identity."23 8 In that regard, the Skillen court invoked the
policy, although not the literal command, of the Indian Child
Welfare Act-a policy recognizing the paramount role of tribal
courts in determining questions affecting the welfare of Indian
children.239
According to Skillen, the various jurisdictional and policy-
based considerations combined to require a rule of exclusive
tribal court jurisdiction whenever a dispute arises involving an
Indian child and at least one Indian parent who reside on the
Reservation. 240 Thus, starting from a flexible and deferential
notion of comity, the court fashioned a jurisdictional rule that
gives an exclusive role to tribal courts where the essential facts
of reservation-based residence and tribal membership exist.
Significantly, the court's definition of residence, drawn from
state statutory law, utilized a concept more akin to legal domi-
cile than mere physical residence. 241 Such a definition would
allow tribal courts to disregard a child's temporary but lengthy
absence from a reservation. The court, moreover, announced a
rule of considerable deference to tribal courts even in the ab-
sence of exclusive tribal jurisdiction. Where the child does not
reside on the reservation, the court explained, a state court
should be cautious in exercising its concurrent jurisdiction in
any dispute involving an Indian child. The court strongly
urged the lower courts to defer to the tribal forum if the tribe is
238. 956 P.2d at 16 (quoting In re Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121, 129 (Mont.
1980) (quoting Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719, 730
(W.D. Mich. 1973))).
239. 956 P.2d at 11, 16.
240. The court formulated its principle in clear terms:
We conclude that in a child custody dispute which involves an en-
rolled tribal member and that person's enrolled child, both of whom
live within the exterior boundaries of the Reservation, state jurisdic-
tion would threaten the tribe's political integrity and welfare, even
though another party to the dispute is a non-Indian who resides off
the Reservation.
Id. at 17.
241. The court quoted Montana's statutory definition of residence, includ-
ing the provisions that one's residence is where one remains when not called
elsewhere for a temporary purpose, that there may only be one residence, that
a residence cannot be lost until another is gained, and that the residence of a
minor whose parents live apart is the residence of the parent with whom the
minor customarily resides. See Skillen, 956 P.2d at 19 (quoting MONT. CODE
ANN. § 1-1-215 (1997)).
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better equipped to determine the child's best interests, in light
of the child's ethnic and cultural identity.242
The Skillen court's approach, while provoking a pointed
dissent,243 reveals that state courts can be sensitive to unique
tribal interests in adjudicating custody of Indian children even
in the absence of explicit statutory commands. As a matter of
common law, the court created a doctrine of emphatic defer-
ence to the tribal forum where tribal membership and reserva-
tion-based residence coincide. In addition, in situations falling
outside exclusive tribal jurisdiction under the Skillen formula-
tion, the court nevertheless suggested that state courts assume
a posture of more flexible deference based on comity towards
tribal courts. In essence, the Montana Supreme Court recog-
nized that custody matters involving an Indian child implicate
unique policy concerns and require the invocation of special ju-
risdictional principles.
C. ILLUSTRATIONS
Some hypothetical scenarios may i11uminat the differ-
ences between a UCCJEA/PKPA approach and a comity-based
approach to tribal-state conflicts in the child custody area. Al-
though in many situations the doctrine of comity and the
statutory mandate would yield the same ultimate result, these
illustrations are designed to highlight the potential disparities
in decree-recognition under the two approaches and the re-
sulting dilemma created for tribes in forcing a choice between,
on the one hand, conformity to the dominant jurisdictional
model and, on the other hand, reliance on divergent standards
that are more culturally compatible.
1. Facts: Mother and Father, both enrolled members of
Tribe X, are disputing custody of their child, also an enrolled
member of the Tribe. Mother has lived off the Reservation in
State A with the child for one year, and Father lives on the
Reservation. Father files a petition for custody of the child in
tribal court and, after a proceeding in which Mother partici-
pates, Father is awarded permanent custody. Mother does not
relinquish the child but, instead, files an action in a court of
242. 956 P.2d at 18 (requiring Montana trial court to consider whether "its
exercise of jurisdiction would... undermine tribal authority in such a way as
to infringe on the tribe's right to self-government").
243. See Skillen, 956 P.2d at 19-28 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (arguing that the majority was guilty of 'judicial legislation"
in creating a rule of exclusive jurisdiction without statutory authority).
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State A for custody. Father appears in state court and con-
tends that State A must recognize and enforce the tribal de-
cree.
Resolution: If State A has adopted the UCCJEA and opted
to extend the Act to Indian tribes, then the courts of State A
would not enforce the tribal decree. As stated by the reporter
for the Drafting Committee of the UCCJEA, a custody decree
based solely on tribal membership "would not qualify for en-
forcement under [the] Act," if jurisdictional criteria are not
otherwise met.244 In the given facts, State A would be the
child's home state and, as such, would have priority over other
sovereigns for initial child custody jurisdiction.245 At most,
Tribe X's status under the UCCJEA would be that of a state
with "significant connection" jurisdiction. Under the Act, the
courts of Tribe X would not have authority to make a custody
determination unless State A first declined to exercise jurisdic-
tion.246 The fact that all parties involved are members of Tribe
X would be irrelevant under the Act.
In a comity-based approach, on the other hand, a court in
State A would be likely to enforce the tribal decree because of
the paramount (if not exclusive) tribal role in adjudicating the
domestic relations of tribal members. In deciding whether to
enforce the tribal decree out of comity, the state court would
need to determine whether the tribe had power over the subject
matter and the parties as a matter of federal Indian law.247
Under accepted precedents, the tribe's authority is clear, since
the parents and child are all enrolled members and Father is
domiciled on the reservation.248 Tribe X would also have juris-
diction under its own laws if its tribal code resembled many of
the codes described in Part III of this Article. Under a doctrine
244. See Spector, supra note 118, at 323 n.42.
245. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT §
201(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 250 (Supp. 1998).
246. See id. § 201(a)(2).
247. See Wilsonv. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9thCir. 1997).
248. State and tribal courts alike have long agreed that, absent a congres-
sional act or treaty to the contrary, where all parties to a dispute are tribal
members and the claim has some connection to the tribe's reservation, the
tribal court has civil jurisdiction over the proceeding. See Frejo v. Barney, 3
Navajo Rptr. 233, 236 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982); Malaterre v. Malaterre,
293 N.W.2d 139, 143 (N.D. 1980); cf. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382,
389 (1976) (stating that tribe had exclusive jurisdiction over custody dispute




of comity, then, the courts of State A would most likely recog-
nize and enforce the tribal decree through the local state judi-
cial processes.
2. Facts: Child and Mother, both enrolled members of
Tribe X, have lived on the Reservation for all of the child's life.
Father, a non-Indian, lives off the Reservation in State A.
With the consent of Mother, child moves off the Reservation for
the school year to attend school in State A while residing with
Father. After seven months have passed, Father files a cus-
tody petition in the court of State A. Mother immediately files
her own action in tribal court, but State A proceeds to award
custody to Father. Mother pursues her tribal court action
seeking the return of the child. Father argues that Tribe X
must enforce State A's decree.
Resolution: Under the terms of the UCCJEA, State A is the
child's home state and has exclusive jurisdiction to make an
initial custody determination regarding the child. If Tribe X
has adopted the UCCJEA, it has no discretion to refuse en-
forcement since it lacks authority over the matter. The fact
that the child's domicile would be deemed to be on the Reserva-
tion of Tribe X would be irrelevant.
Under the doctrine of comity as it was formulated in In re
Marriage of Skillen, on the other hand, the child and Mother
would be viewed as domiciled on the Reservation of Tribe X.249
The tribe would have exclusive jurisdiction of the custody dis-
pute since it involved a parent and child who are enrolled
members and "residents" of the Reservation. The courts of
State A would be deemed to lack authority to decree the cus-
tody of the child.
3. Facts: Mother and child are enrolled members of Tribe
X. Father is a non-Indian who lives off the Reservation. The
child lived with Mother for several years on the Reservation,
then resided with Father. The child and Father have lived
peripatetically, residing temporarily in several states, includ-
ing a three-month period in State A, a three-month period in
State B, and a three-month period in State C. After the third
month in State C, Father finally files a custody petition in the
local courts, and Mother immediately files for custody in tribal
court. Father argues in the court of State C that it should ex-
249. The child's temporary absence from the reservation would not defeat
a finding of domicile. See Skillen, 956 P.2d at 19.
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ercise jurisdiction in the case, while Mother argues that the
state court should defer to the tribal court.
Resolution: Under the UCCJEA, both State C and Tribe X
would have concurrent "significant connection" jurisdiction
over the custody dispute. In such a situation, the UCCJEA,
like its predecessor, gives priority to the action filed first in
time.2 0 Thus, the court of State C would have priority to pro-
ceed with the case. Where two court systems have concurrent
jurisdiction and simultaneous proceedings are pending, the
UCCJEA gives no weight to the particular benefits that a
tribal court might bring to a custody dispute involving an In-
dian child.
Under a comity-based approach, as explained in the case
law, the tribal court might hold a position of preference in the
custody dispute. Following the Montana Supreme Court's for-
mulation in Skillen, the state would need to remain sensitive
to "the tribe's interest in deciding the custody of one of its
members," and would need to insure that it does not under-
mine tribal authority so as to infringe on the tribe's right to
self-government. 251 The application of that doctrine arguably
would lead to a relinquishment of jurisdiction by State C in fa-
vor of the tribe.
4. Facts: Mother and child are enrolled members of Tribe
X and have resided on the Reservation of Tribe X throughout
the child's life. Father is not an enrolled member of any tribe
and lives in State A. Mother files a custody petition in tribal
court and obtains an award of custody of the child. Father,
who refused to participate in the tribal court proceeding, files a
custody petition in the courts of State A. Mother argues that
State A must recognize and enforce the tribal custody decree.
Father argues that the tribal court was fundamentally biased
and acted without jurisdiction.
Resolution: Under the UCCJEA and the PKPA, if the tribe
were deemed a "state" within the meaning of those statutes,
the tribal decree would be entitled to recognition and enforce-
ment in the courts of State A. As the home state of the child,
Tribe X had exclusive jurisdiction to make an initial custody
250. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 206,
9 U.L.A. at 256 (barring court from exercising jurisdiction if action concerning
custody of child has been commenced in court of another state having jurisdic-
tion substantially in conformity with the Act).




determination. The failure of Father to participate in the pro-
ceeding would not deprive the court of jurisdiction so long as
Father was given adequate notice pursuant to the UCCJEA.
The courts of State A would have no discretion to refuse to en-
force the judgment. Moreover, according to both the UCCJEA
and the PKPA, the tribe would retain exclusive jurisdiction to
modify the decree affecting the custody of the child so long as
Tribe X remained the home of the child or the Mother.2 52
If the courts of State A were not bound by the statutory
mandate but instead relied on the doctrine of comity, the result
most likely would be similar. The tribal membership and res-
ervation-based domicile of the mother and child would satisfy
the jurisdictional prerequisites of most tribal codes as well as
the jurisdictional tenets of federal Indian law. Under the prin-
ciples of comity as formulated by the Skillen court, for example,
the decree would be entitled to recognition and enforcement
because the tribe's power to determine the custody of Indian
children who reside on the reservation is a necessary corollary
of tribal sovereignty. The Skillen court, moreover, announced
that the tribe would retain exclusive jurisdiction for as long as
the child and mother remained residents of the reservation.
On the other hand, the discretionary nature of comity
would leave room for a hostile state court judge to refuse rec-
ognition. As in Barbry v. Dauzat,253 a biased state court might
refuse to accept the tribe's definition of membership. Without
the critical underpinning of tribal membership, the tribal court
might be viewed as lacking the authority to determine the cus-
tody of the child, and such a state court could proceed to de-
termine custody without regard to the tribe's earlier award.
As these illustrations suggest, the extension of the
UCCJEA to Indian tribes (or the construction of the PKPA to
apply to tribes as held in Eberhard) may place certain catego-
ries of tribal decrees in jeopardy. Under the UCCJEA/PKPA
framework, state courts can refuse to recognize a custodial or-
der from a tribal forum that rests primarily on the tribal mem-
bership of the child and one of the parents. Even if a child
252. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 202,
9 U.L.A. at 252; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1994).




were domiciled on a reservation but temporarily absent for
more than six months, the UCCJEA/PKPA would subordinate
the tribe's authority to that of the state where the child has
most recently resided. Thus, the innocuous and technical ter-
minology of the Uniform Act could make significant inroads on
definitions of tribal power. In contrast, under a comity-based
approach, state courts generally defer to a tribe's traditional
bases of jurisdiction and give respect to such tribal decrees.
Comity can take into account the federal policy favoring the
tribal role in adjudications involving children who are mem-
bers of the tribe and who claim the reservation as their perma-
nent home.
On the other hand, the UCCJEA and the PKPA, if applied
to tribes, will guarantee enforcement of tribal decrees when the
decrees rest on jurisdictional foundations that are consistent
with statutory requirements. And, while most interpretations
of comity would likewise result in recognition of the tribal de-
cree under such circumstances, the doctrine can become a tool
for undermining the legitimacy of tribal courts in the hands of
a hostile state judge. In certain situations, then, the statutory
scheme promises more predictable recognition than does the
more malleable doctrine of comity. It is this predictability that
creates an incentive for Indian tribes to abandon their non-
conforming bases of jurisdiction in favor of the uniform stan-
dards.
V. ACCOMMODATING THE COMPETING INTERESTS
Indian tribes wishing to enhance the enforceability of their
child custody decrees face an uneasy choice today. Where the
UCCJEA has been adopted and extended to tribes, a tribe has
a clear incentive to conform its jurisdictional law to the Uni-
form Act's model. By so doing, the tribe effectively ensures
that its child custody decrees will be accorded recognition in
the state courts. Such a choice, however, carries with it the
subordination of the tribe's traditional jurisdictional rules.
Those rules, as well as the substantive custody standards ap-
plied by tribal courts, form a part of the tribe's cultural iden-
tity. As explained by Christine Zuni, "[1law is a significant
part of all cultures and to the extent that Anglo-American con-
cepts displace native concepts, native culture is changed."254 If,
on the other hand, a tribal decree rests on such traditional ju-
254. Zuni, supra note 17, at 24.
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risdictional bases as reservation domicile and tribal member-
ship, the custody decree may not receive enforcement in states
adhering to the new Uniform Act.
It is worth recalling the factual assumption underlying the
original UCCJA and carried over into the new UCCJEA. The
Commissioners have assumed that most "American children"
adjust to new environments within six months such that the
new location becomes their "home."255 That assumption may be
entirely plausible when the change is from Pittsburgh to De-
troit, or even from Sacramento to Atlanta. The lingering ties
that the child might feel to her former neighborhood would
soon fade. But what about the Navajo child who moves from
Chinle, Arizona, to Houston, or the Zuni child who leaves her
pueblo in northern New Mexico to join her non-Indian parent
in New Orleans? Are the ties of such children to their reserva-
tions and their tribes as easily erased? I think not.256
The states, through a combination of judicial and legisla-
tive creativity, are in a position to accommodate the unique cir-
255. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 144
(quoting Ratner, supra note 97, at 818). See discussion supra at notes 81-82
and accompanying text.
256. Mother Earth in Navajo tradition reflects a particular understanding
of place. As Chief Justice Tso has observed:
Just like our natural mother, our Mother Earth provides for us. It is
not wrong to accept the things we need from the earth. It is wrong to
treat the earth with disrespect .... If people can understand that the
Navajo regard nature and the things in nature as relatives, then they
will easily see that nature and the Navajos depend upon each other.
Understanding this relationship is essential to understanding tradi-
tional Navajo concepts which may be applied in cases concerning
natural resources and the environment.
Tso, supra note 10, at 233-34. Similarly, Frank Pommersheim has tried to
capture the meaning of land for Indian peoples:
The reservation is home. It is a place where the land lives and stalks
people; a place where the land looks after people and makes them live
right; a place where the earth provides solace and nurture. Yet,
paradoxically, it is also a place where the land has been wounded; a
place where the sacred hoop has been broken; a place stained with
violence and suffering. And this painful truth also stalks the people
and their Mother.
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 10, at 15. Pomnersheim explains that land bears
several levels of meaning for Indian tribes. It not only provides subsistence
for tribal members, whether through natural resources or otherwise, but it
also is "the source of spiritual origins and sustaining myth." Id. at 14.
Moreover, a tribe's land is where generations of relatives have lived. See id.
The voices of contemporary Indian authors also reveal the profound and last-
ing impact of growing up on the reservation. See, e.g., SHERMAN ALEXIE,
FIRST INDIAN ON THE MOON (1993).
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curnstances of Indian children. If a state legislature adopts the
new UCCJEA and wishes to extend its provisions to Indian
tribes, it could include special recognition principles for tribal
decrees. The Act should not require tribes to demonstrate per-
fect conformity to majoritarian standards before according the
tribal decrees recognition and enforcement. A modified act, for
example, could provide that a tribal decree resting on the res-
ervation-based domicile of a member child is presumptively en-
forceable (even if a child were temporarily absent from the res-
ervation), and that the tribe would have exclusive jurisdiction
in such a circumstance. This "modified uniform act approach"
would acknowledge the tribe's traditional bases of power while
still achieving predictability and certainty in custody disputes
involving Indian children. Alternatively, state legislatures
may exclude Indian tribes from the reach of the Uniform Act
and leave the question of recognition of tribal custody decrees
entirely up to the courts. In fashioning principles of recogni-
tion, the state judiciaries can ensure respect for the unique
contributions of tribal judges in the resolution of family dis-
putes involving tribal children. The comity approach utilized
in Skillen exemplifies such a possibility.257 To the extent that
state courts can articulate clear recognition rules, they can
likewise lend predictability to the questions of enforcement of
custody decrees across reservation boundaries.
Another path towards accommodating the unique tradi-
tions and values of Indian tribes concerning family and child-
rearing while promoting cooperation between tribes and other
sovereigns is through individualized negotiated agreements be-
tween tribal and state governments. Indeed, several contem-
porary Indian scholars have recommended greater use of
tribal-state negotiation in addressing cross-boundary enforce-
ment of judgments in commercial contexts,25 8 and such indi-
257. The Montana Supreme Court embraced such a rule of deference to the
role of tribal courts in child custody disputes involving Indian children resid-
ing on reservation lands. See In re Marriage of Skillen, 956 P.2d 1 (Mont.
1998), discussed supra at notes 234-43 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., Deloria & Laurence, supra note 53. It should be noted that
Deloria and Laurence explicitly exclude inter-system child custody enforce-
ment from the scope of their discussion, stating
The questions of whether the concerns of the [PKPA], and similar
[statutes], should require standard solutions and uniform reach
across the states, and whether leaving tribal decrees out would seri-
ously impair any needed uniformity are issues that implicate policies




vidualized agreements may be suitable in the child custody
arena as well.25 9 In such negotiations, tribes could articulate
why particular assertions of jurisdiction are essential to tribal
sovereignty and these policy considerations may encourage
both the state legislature and the state judiciary to accord re-
spect to the tribal decision. Similarly, tribes and states could
work together to devise court rules addressing the question of
child custody jurisdiction and enforcement.260 The option of fo-
cusing on court rules rather than legislation has the advantage
of avoiding the political and divisive nature of legislative de-
bates about Indian matters.261 Further, a tribe in negotiation
with a state could agree to reciprocal obligations of judgment
recognition so long as the state agreed to respect the tribe's de-
fined sphere of power in child custody disputes.262
In summary, the task of resolving questions of child cus-
tody jurisdiction and enforcement as between states and tribes
should be approached with sensitivity to the competing inter-
ests of tribes, states, and children. A state's wooden insistence
that tribes adhere to uniform jurisdictional rules without re-
gard to more traditional bases of tribal power can erode the
tribe's cultural identity. Native scholars have recognized that
"[1]egitimization should not come at such a high price."2 63 In-
stead, creative solutions are possible that would recognize the
sovereign status of tribes and states without requiring tribes to
emulate the states in every jurisdictional and substantive rule.
Id. at 377; see also Frickey, supra note 37, at 1781-84 (suggesting that nego-
tiation rather than adjudication holds more promise as a path towards reform
in Indian law).
259. Tribal-state agreements are not unknown in the family law area. In
the context of child support enforcement, for example, Congress has recog-
nized the ability of states and tribes to enter cooperative agreements on such
matters as wage withholding and the use of tax intercepts to collect support
for Indian children. See 42 U.S.C. § 654(7) (1994).
260. Some states have adopted court rules as a result of state-tribal coop-
eration in the area of judgment recognition. See, e.g., N.D. CT. R. ANN. 7.2
(Michie 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25 (Michie 1992). See generally
Jones, supra note 71, at 482-83. Chief Justice Jones of the Turtle Mountain
Chippewa Tribal Court of Appeals is particularly optimistic about the use of
tribal-state forums for addressing questions of jurisdiction and judgment rec-
ognition.
261 See Jones, supra note 71, at 484.
262. Reciprocity of judgment recognition is a matter of significant concern
in some states. See id. at 483 n.114 (citing court rules in Michigan, Okla-
homa, and Washington that require state courts to honor tribal court orders
unless the tribe does not reciprocally recognize state court judgments).




The failure of the original UCCJA and the PKPA to men-
tion Indian tribes is a familiar oversight in law. The
"measured separatism"26 of Indian tribes under federal Indian
jurisprudence has often resulted in measured invisibility. In
one sense, then, the invitation in section 104 of the newly-
promulgated UCCJEA is a welcome recognition of tribal sover-
eignty. Nevertheless, the carrot and stick approach-granting
recognition of tribal decrees in state court in exchange for the
tribe's incorporation of the jurisdictional standards of the Act-
is troublesome. The jurisdictional framework of the Act would
exclude several traditional bases of tribal jurisdiction. Moreo-
ver, my brief survey of tribal law suggests that jurisdictional
homogenization can lead to the homogenization of substantive
standards as well.
According to some observers, Indian tribes are experienc-
ing a period of cultural renewal and rebirth.265 Others decry
the imminent loss of tribal identity on the altar of assimila-
tion.266 Without taking sides in this debate, I have tried to il-
luminate one way in which an Indian tribe's struggle for le-
gitimacy in the eyes of the dominant society may undermine
the tribe's cultural identity. In the culturally central area of
child custody, tribes should think carefully before molding
their jurisdictional laws to conform to the standards of Anglo-
American uniform acts. Similarly, state courts should consider
the tradeoffs involved before requiring absolute conformity
from tribal courts. The controversial debate in Eberhard on
the implications of child custody recognition for tribal sover-
eignty-a debate waged between the tribal court and represen-
264. The term "measured separatism" has been used to describe the status
of tribes as a result of treaties and settlements with the federal government.
See WILKINSON, supra note 27, at 120-21; Pommersheim, supra note 9, at 415.
265. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 10, at 194 (tribal nations currently are
in a period of intense cultural renewal and spiritual rebirth); MARKS, supra
note 16, at xvii-xviii (despite history of oppression and dislocations, Indians
have fought to hold on to homelands and to regain sacred places); CARRILLO,
supra note 50, at 5, 7 (Indian groups are reclaiming tribal identity, and tribes'
legal innovations in the face of injustice are "nothing short of inspirationally
astounding"); Valencia-Weber, supra note 25, at 262 (use of custom increas-
ingly the pattern in tribal courts).
266. See Porter, supra note 17, at 238 (Native Americans generally and




tatives of the tribal council-demonstrates the core importance
of the question for Indian tribes today.
As a non-Indian who teaches future lawyers for a living, I
value a multiplicity of voices, including those emanating from
our indigenous cultures, when I explore family law with my
students. We can learn much from these nations within a na-
tion; their traditions can enrich our own understanding of cul-
ture, group identity, the definitions of family, and the role of
law. In the embattled arena of child custody litigation, Anglo-
American judges and legislatures have long debated ways to
improve the substance and the process of dispute resolution.267
The unique experience and perspective of American Indian
tribes, both historical and contemporary, should inform that
debate. As we approach the millennium, Indian peoples and
non-Indians alike need to understand that the forces of as-
similation can operate in small, seemingly unimportant ways.
In this Article, I have suggested that a tribe that conforms to
Anglo-American jurisdictional laws in the child custody arena
may be sacrificing some degree of cultural identity.268 To the
extent that a tribe's identity is diminished, all of us lose a
promise of human possibility.269
267. The American Law Institute is currently debating a set of proposed
"Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution" regarding the resolution of child
custody disputes. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS pt. I (Tentative Draft No. 3, Mar. 20, 1998). The
Draft, which offers predictable rules with more definite guidelines than the
opaque and inherently subjective "best interests" standard, see id. at 2
(introductory discussion), is apparently generating heated controversy. See
ALL Members Clash over Child Custody While Child Support Draft Sails
Smoothly, 66 U.S.L.W. 2722-24 (May 26, 1998).
268. Just as current federal policy aims at preserving biological species
faced with extinction, some have argued for a kind of cultural ecology-to pre-
serve from extinction the indigenous peoples whom the Europeans encoun-
tered on these lands centuries ago. As Chief Justice Tso of the Navajo Nation
pointedly observed, "[wie are part of the total environment of America and at
least as important as the snail darter or the California condor." Tso, supra
note 10, at 232.
269. As Jamake Highwater observed, "[elvery view of the world that be-
comes extinct, every culture that disappears, diminishes a possibility."
JAMAKE HIGHWATER, THE PRIMAL MIND: VISION AND REALITY IN INDIAN
AMERICA 9 (1981) (commenting on OcTAviO PAZ, THE LABYRINTH OF SOLITUDE
(1967)), quoted in TULLY, supra note 45, at 186.
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